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Abstract 
It is generally accepted that the environmental context present during memory encoding 
serves as an effective cue for recall if reinstated during retrieval. Participants who perform a 
free recall test in the same context as that during which they learned a set of words, often 
remember more words than participants who experience a context mismatch from encoding to 
retrieval. This is referred to as the context-dependent memory effect and forgetting due to a 
change in context is referred to as context-dependent forgetting. Recent evidence suggests that 
contexts need not always be physical but can be mentally generated or imagined and still serve 
to produce a context-dependent memory effect. That is, participants who recall information in a 
reinstated imagined context remember more words than those that do not reinstate the 
imagined context at recall, even when in a physically different context. Four experiments were 
conducted in an attempt to replicate context-dependent memory effects using imagined 
contexts and mental reinstatement. Participants learned a list of words in one physical context 
(room) followed by a free recall test in either the same or different room. Some participants 
were given instructions to imagine a context (one from a picture or a self-relevant context) 
during encoding and to later reinstate this imagined context at recall while in a physically 
different room. Results showed that not only was there no difference in number of words 
recalled among groups who imagined a context and those that did not, but that there was no 
effect of physical context as well. This set of studies demonstrates that context effects, whether 
physical or mentally generated, are not as robust as currently conceptualized. 
Keywords: imagination; memory; context reinstatement; recall; forgetting; self  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
One does not need to have a deficit in memory in order to experience disruptions of 
recall. We struggle many times a day to recall information we need; where items were placed, 
what we ate for breakfast, even what we were just doing a moment ago. What does it take to 
reconstruct a memory accurately? Are we aware of the factors that lead to the encoding of that 
information in the first place? Is there a way to protect ourselves against forgetting?  
Memories are encoded into a trace along with context, a multi-faceted factor that may 
determine what and how well we remember something. Context has long been thought to be 
an important cue for memory, but some evidence suggests that contexts effects may not always 
be reliable. Exploring the criticality of context-dependent memory is necessary if we wish to 
appreciate why we remember, and often more pertinent, why we forget.    
Context-dependent memory 
Context-dependent memory is the phenomenon whereby information learned in one 
context (typically the physical environment) is better remembered in that same context and is 
more likely forgotten in a different one. We have probably experienced this in our daily lives – 
much to our frustration – where we think about getting something in our house, say upstairs, 
repeating it several times to ourselves before ascending, and once ascended immediately forget 
what it was that we were supposed to retrieve. This is probably due to the fact that we were 
trying to remember something in a different context than where we first learned it, with the 
bottom of the stairs being a context that does match the context of the top of the stairs. But 
when we return to the bottom of the stairs, the memory suddenly comes to mind, as now we 
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have returned to the original context, and we question how we could be so forgetful in a matter 
of seconds.  
 Context can be conceived of as more than just an encoding environment or location and 
can affect more than just recall of basic facts or items. For example, environmental context has 
been shown to affect memory for performed actions, where words that were physically 
performed were better remembered in the original context where they were acted out than in a 
different context (Sahakyan, 2010). Context also has been shown to affect memory for words 
after a change in physiological state due to a drug (Eich, Weingartner, Stillman, & Gillin, 1975) 
and even visual recognition and recall of symbols and faces due to a change in mood (Robinson 
& Rollings, 2011). Thus, physiological or emotional state may also serve as an important internal 
context for memory besides that of the external environment. Carr (1925) shares an amusing 
story where physiological state was indeed a necessary context: “There is the old story of the 
Irish porter who misplaced a package while drunk and was able to recall its location during a 
subsequent period of drunkenness” (p. 252). 
These accounts of memory being affected by a change in context suggest that the item is 
somehow integrated with the context. When we encode an item in memory, it becomes 
mentally associated with the context and recall is best when the association is strong, direct and 
numerous (Carr, 1925). This association is dependent on the context however, and without its 
presence, forgetting is more likely. Forgetting due to a change of context is referred to as 
context-dependent forgetting, where memory suffers from the mismatch of original encoding 
context and later retrieval context. Smith (1979) notes that being provided with the same 
learning context will activate the original contextual representations which in turn will provide 
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access to original mental representations of the associated material and thus facilitate memory. 
This is known as the reinstatement paradigm and is a common way researchers study context-
dependent memory. In these studies, a participant learns information in one context and when 
later tested in the same context, have better memory than individuals who were tested in a 
different context. Reinstating the original learning context at test maintains the contextual 
associations necessary to probe memory. In a classic study by Godden and Baddeley (1975), 
they show the importance of environmental context and forgetting that occurs when 
environments change from encoding to recall.  
  Godden and Baddeley (1975) demonstrated that context effects can be elicited with 
free recall in two natural environments, on land and underwater. They tested groups of divers in 
these two environments for recall of a list of words that were either learned on land or in the 
water. Divers that were tested in the same environment where they first learned the words 
were able to recall more words than divers tested in an environment differing from the original 
encoding context. Thus, the change in context from encoding to test hindered recall and shows 
that maintaining the same context is beneficial for free recall of words. 
This study seems to clearly demonstrate context effects, albeit in two outdoor 
environments that we may not encounter in our daily lives. Smith, Glenberg, and Bjork (1978) 
showed that the same effect can be replicated in an indoor context, more specifically a school 
setting. They had participants study a list of word pairs in one room and then complete a cued-
recall test in either the same or different room two days later. Participants who performed the 
recall task in the same room where they initially studied the word pairs recalled more words 
than those who changed to a different room. In fact, context effects can be elicited by an even 
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simpler method than moving large distances between land and water or classroom and 
classroom.  
Radvansky and Copeland (2006) showed that by simply walking through a doorway, 
individuals displayed worse memory and greater errors for items with which they had just 
interacted. They attribute this to the location updating effect whereby the mental situation 
model that helps us to understand relationships between objects and the environment, is 
disrupted by moving through doorways (Radvansky, Krawietz, & Tamplin, 2011). While 
navigating through a virtual indoor environment, participants were instructed to carry an 
object, or place an object on a table, and then either move through a doorway or continue 
walking forward in the room. They were then given a recognition test for the object they had 
just interacted with. An increase in reaction time and a greater number of identification errors 
were made in groups that went through doorways into a different room and experienced a 
spatial shift (Radvansky & Copeland, 2006). It is possible that this is due to the differing contexts 
experienced between the two sides of the door, and that the shift in context caused a 
disruption in the associations between the object and its relevant environment. 
While the above focuses on more of a source-monitoring perspective (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), context-dependent memory is usually thought to be cue driven 
and abiding by the encoding specificity principle (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). Source monitoring 
– remembering the origin of a memory – involves retrieving many details, one of which may be 
contextual information. Having to constantly update a mental situation model in order to 
remember the interaction with an object as one passes through doors utilizes source 
monitoring, with an aspect of that source possibly being the environmental context. 
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Participants need to be aware of whether they had picked up or placed down an object, as well 
as where in space they were when presented with the memory test, and thus be constantly 
aware of the source of their memory before making a decision (Radvansky & Copeland, 2006). 
Retrieval cues on the other hand are a direct link to the memory event, and may also be 
contextual by nature. According to the encoding specificity principle, the retrieval of an item 
depends on the similarity between the encoding and retrieval situations, in that the match 
between a cue present at encoding and retrieval will elicit the appropriate memory (Tulving & 
Thomson, 1973). This was indeed found when participants learned a list of words each 
associated with a word cue, and these cues were again present during recall (Tulving & Osler, 
1968). Participants recalled more words when the cue was present during both encoding and 
retrieval, and this level of recall was more than when the retrieval cue was absent, a different 
cue was present, or a combination of the original cue and different cue were present at recall 
instead. The initial cue was the most effective cue as it matched both the situation at encoding 
and retrieval and was best able aid memory of the item.  
While Tulving and Thomson (1973) demonstrate that memory subscribes to the 
encoding specificity principle, they also note the effectiveness of different types of retrieval 
cues in memory. They find that memories are best elicited by reinstated input cues, or those 
that were present along with the item during encoding, rather than associates (similar cues) or 
copies of the target word (Thomson & Tulving, 1970; Tulving & Thomson, 1973). Participants 
were cued by words associated with the initial cue or literal copies of the target words (that 
participants generated themselves in a free association task with the cue words before test) and 
neither of these proved as effective as the original input cue provided by the researchers. This 
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surprisingly demonstrates that even though participants can recognize and are aware of the 
target words (after all they generated these themselves!) they can only be accurately recalled 
when the solitary initial cue is present (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). It seems that these input 
cues are more similar to the initial encoding situation, or cognitive environment present during 
the encoding process than anything else, and are a necessary component for retrieval. 
Therefore, if an environmental context were the same as that during input or encoding, and it 
was reinstated during retrieval, then it would serve as an effective input cue with which to 
revive the corresponding cognitive environment and facilitate memory. In this way, 
environmental context can act as an effective cue. 
 The nature of the environmental context has also been conceptualized as having 
different forms. One distinction, whether the context is incidental or intentional refers to the 
way the context is encoded. One may encode the context without conscious effort (incidental) 
or the context may be intentional or consciously associated with the to-be-remembered item 
(Smith & Vela, 2001). Traditionally, environmental contexts are encoded incidentally, whereby 
participants in a study are focusing attention on the target information and not attending to the 
learning or test contexts while performing tasks.  
Contexts can also be referred to as extrinsic or intrinsic. Extrinsic contexts are considered 
independent from the items, as compared with intrinsic contexts which are associated directly 
with stimuli (Hewitt, 1977; as cited in Godden & Baddeley, 1980). Intrinsic contexts may be 
properties of the stimuli themselves, for example, the font (e.g., size, typeface, colour) of list 
words. Extrinsic contexts also take different forms. Maren, Phan, and Liberzon (2013) note that 
extrinsic contexts may be cognitive (e.g., expectations that may influence encoding and 
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retrieval), interoceptive (e.g., hormonal and physiological states), environmental (spatial), 
temporal, or social and cultural. While intrinsic contexts are inevitably processed during 
encoding, and extrinsic contexts seem supplementary to the items encoded, it is evident that 
both are relevant in context-dependent memory (Godden & Baddeley, 1980).  
Lastly, context can be considered global or local, in reference to the number of items 
they are associated with (Glenberg, 1979). Global contexts, are considered those that are less 
specific and are connected with many items, such as a room which contains various items, 
furniture, and equipment that is associated with a list of words. Local contexts are more unique; 
for example, if context were word colour, each word may be associated with a different colour 
of text. Local and global contexts have been shown to influence recognition memory in different 
ways, with local context affecting recognition memory more than global context (Dalton, 1991). 
In fact, type of context seems to play a role in distinguishing between the presence or absence 
of context effects depending on the type of memory test.    
Recall and Recognition 
Seeing that context effects are generally robust, and their impact depends on a variety 
of factors regarding the manipulation of type of context (Smith & Vela, 2001), it should be noted 
that these results, at an experimental level, differ with respect to the type of memory test. 
When examining context effects, it has been found that they are much more robust for tests of 
recall than tests of recognition (Smith, 1988). Smith and Vela (2001) predicted that free recall 
tests should be the most affected by context, followed by cued-recall and recognition tests, as 
these latter tests rely more on non-environmental cues. For example, in cued-recall and 
recognition tests, experimenters provide cues at test (the retrieval cue and the item itself, 
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respectively) that make the use of environmental context cues less likely. The presence of the 
target word itself in recognition tests serves as a more effective cue than environmental context 
cues, thus making environmental context unnecessary (Brown, 1976). In recall tests on the 
other hand, no such cues are provided during test, which increases participant’s reliance on 
other effective cues, one of which would likely be the environmental context. 
  Perhaps the clearest distinction between recall and recognition was found in a pair of 
studies by Godden and Baddeley (1975, 1980). As mentioned previously, in their first study they 
had divers learn a list of words on land or under water and then complete a recall test in either 
of these environments. They found a reliable effect of context, in that divers recalling words in 
the same context where they were learned remembered more words (Godden & Baddeley, 
1975). They then replicated the study using a recognition test instead of a recall test and found 
that there was no difference in number of words remembered across groups (Godden & 
Baddeley, 1980). That is, divers recognized the same number of words regardless of match or 
mismatch of learning and testing contexts. They concluded that this difference is due to the 
opposing effect of environmental context on memory tests, that it is important in recall but not 
in recognition. They suggest that although intrinsic context is important for both recall and 
recognition, extrinsic context is not necessary for recognition as it does not encourage 
participants to use previous internal associations as in recall. Other studies have also shown 
that even when context affects recall, the same manipulations do not show any difference for 
recognition (Smith et al., 1978; Smith, 1982; Fernandez & Glenberg, 1985). 
Whereas context effects are more difficult to elicit in recognition tests, it has been 
demonstrated that recall is more reliably affected, whether learning occurs in one room or 
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multiple rooms (Smith, 1979; Smith et al., 1978) and with recall improving as the number of 
rooms increases (Smith, 1982; Smith, 1984). This multiple room paradigm works by introducing 
multiple, same-length word lists which are each leaned in a different room, and participants are 
asked to recall all lists of words in a different room. Participants usually recall more words 
overall as the number of rooms and corresponding lists increases. For example, a participant 
who learned one list of words in one room would recall less words than a participant who 
learned two lists in two rooms or four lists in four rooms.  
This highlights the dependence of recall on environmental cues. The multiple room 
manipulation suggests that each room serves as a different environmental cue or set of cues 
with which participants can use to organize their memory of the various lists. At test, these 
multiple cues are available for participants to generate and use to aid recall, suggesting that the 
more cues are available, the more item associations can be made, and later utilized. This may 
overcome the issue of cue overload (Watkins & Watkins, 1975) which is where a cue becomes 
associated with too many items and becomes no longer effective. If the opposite occurs, where 
items are associated with several cues instead, this may give the participant more possibilities 
to recover information (Smith, 1984).  
However, it should be noted that the beneficial effect of multiple rooms disappears 
when using the reinstatement paradigm, indicating that increasing the number of cues relative 
to number of items may not hold in all circumstances. In a study where participants were told to 
learn three different word lists in three rooms, or to learn the three lists in one room, when 
they returned to the same context where learning took place, context effects (or better recall in 
the same environment) were only found for participants who learned the lists in the single 
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room (Smith, 1982; Smith, 1984). Increasing the number of environmental context cues (by 
increasing the number of learning rooms) made no difference whether participants were in one 
of the learning environments (same context) or a different context, demonstrating that having 
more input rooms or environmental cues does not necessarily improve number of words 
recalled. Additionally, multiple rooms and reinstatement have not been shown to support an 
effect of context on recognition (Smith, 1982; Murnane & Phelps, 1993).  
The general idea is that environmental context affects recall but leaves recognition 
unaffected. The nature of encoding and retrieval in tests of recognition suggests that it is more 
sensitive to a change in local, intrinsic, or intentional context instead. Nevertheless, some 
attempts to find an effect of context, even when items were integrated or intentionally 
associated with the environmental context have not been successful (Eich, 1985). For example, 
Eich (1985) had participants associate words with specific objects in a room, in a manner similar 
to the method of loci. The method of loci is an old mnemonic first used by ancient Greek and 
Roman speakers to remember long passages of prose. While learning, an individual would 
associate passages with specific features of a location, and when needing to recite the 
information later on, would imagine themselves back in that location. They may ‘walk’ back 
through the environment, for example a street setting, and as they pass each element, say a 
house or a window, would recall each set of information associated with each element (Luria, 
1968). Eich (1985) found that participants who used this technique during encoding and were 
later tested for recall in the same or different room, experienced context effects and recalled 
overall more words than those that did not link words to the environment. However the same 
was not found for recognition. Context did not affect recognition even when the items were 
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integrated with the context, and in fact, isolated items, or those that were not integrated with 
objects in the environment were remembered slightly better than integrated items. This 
puzzling effect demonstrates the difficulty in finding context effects in recognition tests. 
The reliance of memory on global environmental context has been manipulated in 
recognition studies to identify why individuals do not seem to benefit from this type of 
environmental information. Smith (1986) demonstrated that recognition can benefit from global 
environmental cues if other, more local, cues are supressed. Participants were directed to 
complete a short term memory task (shallow encoding) or long term memory task (deep 
encoding) prior to the recognition test in an attempt to influence the following encoding of item 
and environmental contextual information. It was assumed that shallow encoding would 
increase the need to rely on global environmental context cues whereas the associations 
created from deeper encoding would suppress context effects, being useful cues in and of 
themselves. In the short term memory task, participants were presented with ten sets each 
consisting of five words and were required to complete a recall test after every set. Participants 
were unaware there would be another memory (recognition) test later on. Long term memory 
tasks were identical to the short term task but included instructions to memorize the words for 
a later memory test.  
It was found that participants in the same context condition made fewer recognition 
errors as compared to those in the different context condition following the short term memory 
task (Smith, 1986). Thus, the global environmental context can be a useful cue if other more 
specific (local) cues are not available or supressed. This concept, referred to as outshining 
(Smith & Vela, 2001) seems to be an important factor influencing the absence of context effects 
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in recognition studies. Environmental context cues can be outshone at retrieval by other, more 
salient cues, such as cues that have been repeated, are less overloaded, or those that are more 
deeply processed (Smith, 1988). This may be one reason why context effects are seen less in 
recognition studies, as recognition relies on non-environmental cues and other associations 
created during encoding or elicited during test. 
Where context effects for recognition have been found however, the approach to 
studying recognition has focused more on matching context and item associations from 
encoding at test through reinstatement, and determining when there is context-dependent 
discrimination rather than context-dependent recognition. Murnane, Phelps, and Malmberg 
(1999) developed the ICE (item, context, and ensemble) theory where item is the to-be-
remembered item, context is contextual and peripheral information, and ensemble is the 
association of item and context. They determined that matching contextual information from 
encoding at test will only be enough to elicit context-dependent recognition, which is when 
there is an increase in both hit rate and false alarm rate to an old stimulus, and thus no 
difference in discrimination between targets and distractors.  
Participants in a recognition test usually respond old or new to a stimulus presented 
within a context at test, indicating if they remember the item (old) or if it is an item that was 
never presented at study (new). Context-dependent recognition has been found in participants 
who viewed words presented in different contexts, whether that be through the manipulation 
of colours, word position, or photographs of scenes, and were given an old-new recognition test 
(Murnane & Phelps, 1994; Hockley, 2008). Participants viewed test items in either old (same) 
contexts, different or rearranged old contexts, or an entirely new context, and it was found that 
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while there was a difference in hit rate and false alarm rate for the old and different or 
rearranged old contexts as compared to new contexts, there was no difference between old and 
different or rearranged old contexts. Technically, the different or rearranged old contexts are 
new contexts, in that they have never been associated with the correct test items before, 
however participants still responded to them in the same way as they responded to original old 
items. They were not able to clearly discriminate between old and new items. According to ICE, 
ensemble information was not elicited or even created in the first place, that is, participants did 
not create an association with the context and the item, and thus only context-dependent 
recognition, but not discrimination, occurred.  
Conversely, context-dependent discrimination, when there is a measure of 
discrimination (d’) between targets (correct items) and distractors, has been found when there 
is a manipulation of rich or meaningful contexts (Murnane et al., 1999). Meaningful contexts are 
those that encourage participants to create ensemble information through the association of 
the item with the context. Murnane et al. (1999) used the computer to present words on top of 
various pictures which served as rich contexts. Words were imbedded in pictures where 
individuals would normally expect them to appear, such as on a television screen, airplane 
banner or a classroom chalkboard. After giving participants an old-new recognition test in the 
same or different context, they found not only an increase in hit rate and false alarm rate 
(context-dependent recognition) but also an effect of d’ indicating that ensemble information 
had been created and used to increase participant’s discrimination between old and new items.  
However, this increase in discrimination using meaningful contexts has not always been 
found (Hockley, 2008). It seems that participants may not always spontaneously encode 
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ensemble information but must be directed to use contextual information before any change in 
discrimination is found. In the experiments by Murnane et al. (1999) and Hockley (2008) where 
context-dependent discrimination was found, this was under the circumstances where 
participants were instructed to make use of the context present with the item during learning. If 
participants are directed to notice and incorporate contextual information during learning, they 
may be more likely to generate these cues at test (Smith, 1988). For example, context effects 
were only found when participants were explicitly instructed at study to link the environmental 
context with the study item (Eich, 1985). Other studies have since expanded upon the use of 
meaningful stimuli and directed association, finding that context-dependent discrimination can 
be found with face and context picture pairs tested in same or different contexts (Gruppuso, 
Lindsay, & Masson, 2007), and especially with famous (celebrity) faces which are more 
meaningful to participants and more likely to be bound to an associated context (Reder et al., 
2013). 
In trying to make sense of the varying results regarding recall and recognition, Smith and 
Vela (2001) conducted a meta-analysis to determine when incidental, extrinsic, and global 
environmental contexts were and were not important. They looked at 75 studies conducted 
from 1935 to 1997, and calculated 93 effect sizes. It was revealed that context had a reliable 
effect on memory (d = .28), but that there was no difference for type of test (free recall, cued 
recall, recognition) which is seemingly counterintuitive. However, at the level of individual 
experiments, it seems that context effects have been found for recall tests more often than for 
recognition tests. The authors mention this meta-analysis only gives an organized post-hoc 
review of conflicting results but cannot replace the careful methodology of experiments in 
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which more work needs to be done to determine when context is and is not influential to 
memory.  
An Application of Context Reinstatement 
It has been established that context change seems to affect memory negatively for the 
most part, and the effects seem to be mitigated when the original cue or encoding context is 
physically reinstated. The benefits of context reinstatement are apparent not only in research, 
but can be extended in application to the real world. In a handbook by Fisher & Geiselman 
(1992) they outline techniques for police or investigator usage when conducting interviews with 
eyewitnesses of crimes or certain events. Their techniques are based on an empirically tested 
method called the cognitive interview. The cognitive interview focuses on helping eyewitnesses 
to increase the amount of relevant and correct information supplied to the interviewer. The 
interview is based on a central idea in memory whereby a memory trace is composed of many 
features and by increasing the overlap among features from encoding and later in recall, this 
will improve the amount of information able to be remembered (Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, 
& Holland, 1986). Four techniques are applied in the interview in order to assist eyewitnesses: 
(1) Mental reinstatement of the environment and personal interpretations (including 
physical, emotional, and physiological contexts) of the crime scene 
(2) Complete reporting of all information, even if information seems trivial 
(3) Recounting events in a variety of orders and, 
(4) Recounting events from a variety of perspectives 
Of these, mental reinstatement is the first technique used, and rightly so, as it sets the 
stage the other mnemonic retrieval techniques. Seeing as during a crime the eyewitness may 
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not be actively encoding environmental information (due to the emotional charge associated 
with the whirlwind nature of events, as is possible with witnessing any crime), using the 
cognitive interview (including mental reinstatement) at retrieval is all the more important to 
implement in order that correct information is recalled (Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & 
Holland, 1985). Furthermore, physical reinstatement may not be possible as environments may 
have changed from the original state of the crime to visitation, making mental reinstatement a 
convenient and practical tool for investigators. Witnesses are guided by interviewers to simply 
reconstruct the crime scene in their mind in order to access associated information.  
 In a series of studies, the cognitive interview was shown to elicit a greater amount of 
correct information from eyewitnesses through recall, while eliciting no more incorrect nor 
confabulated information in comparison to a standard police interview (Geiselman et al., 1986; 
Fisher, Geiselman, & Amador, 1989; Aschermann, Mantwill, & Köhnken, 1991) or an interview 
conducted under hypnosis (Geiselman et al., 1985). This not only applied to the students in 
these laboratory studies who viewed videos of simulated crimes in the classroom, but to the 
real world as well. Fisher et al. (1989) had police detectives conduct interviews with actual 
victims and eyewitnesses of crimes before and after being trained on use of the cognitive 
interview, and found that compared to detectives that were untrained, the trained detectives 
were able to elicit 63% more correct information from the participants. Therefore, the use of 
the cognitive interview seems to be an excellent tool for the police force in extracting critical 
information from eyewitnesses regarding crimes. 
Since the cognitive interview in its entirety has shown to be useful, we can consider the 
contribution of each of the four techniques. In order to identify the effect of mental 
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reinstatement, another study was done to test the underlying principle that increasing the 
feature overlap between encoding and retrieval should improve memory. Testing the first two 
techniques (mental reinstatement and reporting all information), Geiselman et al. (1986) 
showed that although using all four techniques of the cognitive interview was the most 
successful in eliciting more information, mental reinstatement and reporting all details elicited 
more correct information than for participants who were not given such instructions. Overall, 
seeing that the physical context of the crime is difficult (and may even be impossible) to 
recreate at the time of retrieval, mental reinstatement takes precedence as a relevant memory-
enhancing technique. Fisher and Geiselman (1992) note the influence of multiple types of 
contexts on memory by stating “…memory of an event is greatly influenced by how many of the 
[eyewitness’] original thought patterns, emotional reactions, physiological state, and the 
physical environment can be recreated at the time of the interview” (p. 90), with the techniques 
employed by the cognitive interview serving to increase the amount of relevant information 
retrieved by eyewitnesses, and with mental reinstatement serving an integral role.  
Imagination and Mental Reinstatement 
Context reinstatement serves as an important way to reduce context-dependent 
forgetting, by reinstating original context cues from encoding at test. Mental context 
reinstatement then, through imagination, may be more convenient and just as effective in 
protecting against context-dependent forgetting. Noting the importance of post-event variables 
in memory and their relative ease of manipulation as compared to encoding-based 
manipulations in eyewitness testimony, Krafka & Penrod (1985) also discovered support for 
mental reinstatement as a useful method to enhance recognition memory. Using a natural 
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shopping store environment, they had store clerks identify a supposed suspect they had 
previously interacted with from a lineup of photos. Clerks were instructed to mentally reinstate 
the context at the time of their interaction with the suspect and were provided with physical 
cues (copy of the suspect’s non-photo identification) to help them make a decision. Clerks who 
were given a chance to mentally reinstate the relevant context made more correct 
identifications and less errors than those that did not imagine anything. In a similar study, 
where participants witnessed an act of vandalism, those given a chance to mentally reinstate 
the context through a guided memory reinstatement instruction also made more correct 
identifications of the suspect from a lineup than those participants who received no instruction 
(Malpass & Devine, 1981). Whether participants mostly generated the reinstated context 
themselves from their own memory and a few cues or are provided with detailed instruction, 
mental generation of context seems not only to improve recognition accuracy, but is reflected in 
the strength of confidence ratings provided by participants (Malpass & Devine, 1981; Krafka & 
Penrod, 1985). The usage of mental reinstatement as an ecologically sound method to aid 
eyewitnesses, adds to previous studies that attempted to reduce context-dependent forgetting 
in the real world. 
For accurate eyewitness testimony, inspiration to utilize mental reinstatement as an 
effective technique to elicit information during test or interview was drawn from earlier 
laboratory studies that examined context reinstatement in classrooms. Noting that context 
effects occurred when participants changed rooms between learning and test, Smith (1979) 
wondered why participants did not spontaneously reinstate contextual information when they 
experienced a shift in context. He predicted that participants who changed to a different 
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context (DC) and participants that stayed in the same context (SC) were both capable of using 
mental reinstatement of the learning context, however SC participants were more likely to do 
this than DC participants. Smith (1979, 1984) simply gave the instruction to DC groups to 
remember their previous learning environment and found that their level of recall was 
comparable to that of the SC group. Thus, the physical context is not always necessary for 
reinstatement of the environmental context.  
In a different manipulation of mental reinstatement of environmental context, some 
studies have looked towards imagination of a context as a pre-emptive strategy to reduce 
context-dependent forgetting. The technique of preinstatement has been demonstrated in 
some studies as a way to reduce context-dependent forgetting by having participants imagine 
their future testing environment (Brinegar, Lehman, & Malmberg, 2013). These researchers 
familiarized participants with two physical contexts (an indoor room and outdoor space), one of 
which would be a learning environment and one that would be a test environment. While in the 
learning environment, participants were instructed to imagine themselves within the other 
environment (future test location) and learn a list of words. When they eventually changed to 
the test environment, this preinstatement group of participants experienced greater recall for 
list words than groups who were not given a preinstatement instruction and changed contexts, 
or who had remained in the same context throughout the experiment (Brinegar et al., 2013). 
Therefore, although preinstatement groups changed physical contexts and would be expected 
to suffer context-dependent forgetting, their memory was aided by physical cues from the 
testing context that matched mental cues from the preinstated context. Imagined cues used 
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during preinstatement would have formed associations with test words, and would benefit from 
a later context match during test, thus negating the effect of physical context change. 
This interesting and protective quality of imagined contexts had also been demonstrated 
in a study by Masicampo and Sahakyan (2014). Also using mental context generation, they 
implicate that simply generating and imagining a context which is different than the present 
environment, may in itself be beneficial to memory. That is, the context doesn’t necessarily 
need to be preinstated or be familiar to the participant beforehand, but can be any context as 
long as mental effort is maintained during encoding to associate the context with to-be-
remembered items. 
Masicampo and Sahakyan (2014) had participants learn a list of words in a context A 
while imagining themselves in context A, context B (a previously visited environment) or context 
A’ (a self-generated, transformed context A). These contexts were physical indoor or outdoor 
locations, and A’ was created by asking participants to imagine snow falling from the sky in the 
learning room. They were later tested in environment A, B, or C (a new environment). Results 
indicated that participants who imagined context B or A’ during encoding later recalled more 
words (regardless of their testing environment) than those who imagined context A during 
encoding. It seems that imagining context A while being physically in context A was not 
beneficial and perhaps redundant, possibly due to the poverty of differences or distinctness in 
cues available to organize information, as suggested by the benefits of encoding in multiple 
rooms (Smith, 1984).  
Preinstatement in this case (imagining context B, then testing in context B) 
demonstrated the highest level of recall, due to the fact that cues generated early on were later 
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matched during test. Masicampo and Sahakyan (2014) propose the facilitated-reinstatement 
hypothesis: that an imagined context may protect against forgetting regardless of the actual 
testing environment. Therefore, imagined contexts are akin to a portable form of protection 
that can be brought into any environment in order to protect against forgetting, as long as they 
are associated with the items during encoding and later made available during test. It seems to 
be the case that researchers are interested in discovering ways to make the environmental 
context salient enough that participants are more likely to spontaneously reinstate it during 
test, such as through preinstatement, and in this way context can serve as an effective and self-
generated cue. 
Self-relevant Imagined Contexts 
Seeing the possible benefits of imagined contexts as a way to protect against context-
dependent forgetting, we may wonder how to increase the power of this effect. What types or 
features of imagined contexts make them salient and effective? We have seen previously that 
meaningful contexts may be more likely to become imbedded into a memory trace as ensemble 
information, thus producing context-dependent discrimination in recognition memory tests 
(Murnane et al., 1999). Can such a distinction be made with mentally reinstated or imagined 
contexts? 
Using the strategy of preinstatement of a previously visited physical environment 
(Brinegar et al., 2013) and even the generation of a modified or transformed current physical 
context (Masicampo & Sahakyan, 2014) seem to benefit recall during context change. Would 
the same be true of a purely original imagined context? If participants were given a picture of 
an environment or given instructions to generate their own context, perhaps these types of 
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contexts would be more effective than those based on a current or previously visited physical 
context. Some types of contexts may be easier to generate than others, and it is worth looking 
into what makes a context effective as a reinstatement tool.  
In the following experiments presented in this paper, we initially suggest that self-
relevant imagined contexts may be beneficial in protecting against context-dependent 
forgetting. A self-relevant context is one that participants find personal meaning in and would 
likely associate with strong emotions or a particular vividness. These contexts may be 
environments or places they visit frequently (e.g., a room in their house) or somewhere they 
find particularly engaging or pleasant to reminisce about (e.g., a vacation spot). Self-relevant 
contexts may have an advantage over newly visited physical contexts for a few reasons. 
Masicampo and Sahakyan (2014) note that in their transformed imagined condition 
(context A’) where participants imagined context A modified to pretend snow was falling from 
the ceiling, participants had worse recall than the other imagined situations (context B). This 
may have been due to the fact that context B was more familiar to participants (having recently 
visited this location prior to encoding). Self-relevant contexts on the other hand may be 
something participants are more familiar with than a location they only visit once in the span of 
an experiment. It may also be likely that participants could construct these imagined contexts 
with less effort and more detail if they are familiar with them instead of having to expend effort 
to recall aspects of an unfamiliar room or location. Smith (1979) demonstrated that simply 
providing instructions to mentally reinstate the learning context to participants who changed 
contexts improved their level of recall, in effect creating a greater ease to which participants 
could recall information through the use of context cues. Cues that are easier to utilize may also 
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be spontaneously brought forward during test. Therefore, if participants are asked to generate a 
self-relevant context themselves, it may be easier to spontaneously use to aid recall.  
The Underlying Brain Network for Contextual Memory, Imagination, and the Self 
Evidence from neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies also show there may be a 
connection between context-dependent memory and self-relevant imagination. Common areas 
in the brain that are activated for context-dependent memory, imagination and self-related 
information may indicate a role for their combination in promoting protection against context-
dependent forgetting.  
Neuroscience of context effects 
Considering episodic memory, the hippocampus and the medial temporal lobes (MTL) 
seem to be the areas most implicated in context-dependent memory. The role of the 
hippocampus in episodic memory is famously demonstrated with the patient HM who 
underwent bilateral hippocampal removal due to enduring seizures (Scoville & Milner, 1957). 
Due to this surgery, HM had impaired episodic memory and could no longer integrate the 
spatial and temporal context of occurring events into a coherent memory, which is the essence 
of episodic memory itself (Tulving, 1983). Due to the spatio-temporal nature of episodic 
memory, many studies have implicated the hippocampus in encoding spatial relationships while 
integrating temporal information from the frontal lobes (for a review, see Burgess, Maguire, and 
O'Keefe 2002). More specifically, the right hippocampus is shown to have more of a role in 
spatial memory while the left hippocampus facilitates context-dependent memory.  
In a study by Burgess, Maguire, Spiers, and O’Keefe (2001) using virtual reality and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), participants were required to navigate through a 
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virtual town and interact with two different characters. Each of the characters were in a 
different location and each gave the participant a set of objects. Participants were later tested 
for their memory regarding one of the objects received, the place where the object was 
received, and the person the object was received from in a forced choice test. Critically, these 
questions were asked as the participant approached one of the characters in one of the initial 
locations and thus represent questions using information about previous spatial contexts. 
Burgess et al. (2001) found that there was frontal, medial parietal and medial temporal 
activation for the spatial context tasks. They state that their results support other studies, more 
specifically regarding the hippocampus and the lateralization of function within this structure. 
These results are supported by a study using patients with either left or right temporal 
lobectomies which found that right temporal lobectomy patients had difficulty with spatial tasks 
(i.e., navigation of the virtual town) whereas left temporal lobectomy patients had difficulty 
with tasks favouring context-dependent information (i.e., questions about where and from 
whom the object was received) (Spiers et al., 2001). Therefore, the hippocampus not only 
processes spatial information but context-dependent information, at least when referring to the 
environmental context. 
 In terms of other types of contextual information, the hippocampus has also been 
shown to have a role in contextual fear conditioning. Fear conditioning is a form of classical 
conditioning in which a fear memory and subsequent response (conditioned response; CR) is 
created by repeatedly associating a conditioned stimulus (CS; i.e., a cue) with an aversive 
unconditioned stimulus (UCS). This has been most readily demonstrated in animals but can also 
be demonstrated in human subjects as well (Marschner, Kalisch, Vervliet, Vansteenwegen, & 
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Büchel, 2008). These authors used positron emission tomography (PET) to identify brain areas 
associated with fear conditioning to a forearm shock that had been associated with a picture of 
a room. Two contexts (rooms) were each associated with a CS (a shape superimposed over the 
room) which served as either a reliable or unreliable predictor of an UCS (forearm shock). More 
activity in the hippocampus was found in response to the room and shape that indicated an 
unpredicted shock, showing the processing of fear encoding by contextual association in the 
hippocampus (Marschner et al., 2008).  
Along with the hippocampus, the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and more specifically the right 
anterior PFC (APC) and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPC), also reflect processing of 
contextual information in memory. Using fMRI, activity in the right APC and DLPC was similar 
across test conditions for tasks reflecting retrieval attempt, but varied across test conditions 
depending on the context of the test (Wagner, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1998).  
In their first experiment, Wagner et al. (1998) aimed to test the involvement of the right 
PFC against three hypotheses to determine its’ role in retrieval. They used three types of test 
stimuli whereby words were either high accuracy (studied twice), low accuracy (studied once) or 
new (not studied) and tested participant’s memory with an old-new recognition test. Out of 
three hypotheses – that the right PFC supports retrieval attempt (initiation of the search 
process or evaluation of search results (Kapur et al., 1995; Nyberg et al., 1995)), retrieval effort 
(Schacter, Alpert, Savage, Rauch, & Albert, 1996) or retrieval success (Rugg, Fletcher, Frith, 
Frackowiak, & Dolan, 1996) – results supported the retrieval attempt hypothesis, with equal 
activation across all types of stimuli. If activation was due to retrieval effort, activation of the 
right PFC was expected to be inversely related to retrieval success, with less effort and 
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activation corresponding to successful retrieval. The retrieval-success hypothesis on the other 
hand, predicted that an increase in activation would be seen only with successful retrieval of 
the memory. Neither of these later two hypotheses fit the results however, as regardless of 
successful retrieval, activation was the same for each type of stimuli indicating that the APC and 
DLPC were implicated in retrieval attempt. This pattern of activation and fitting hypothesis 
differed in the second experiment however, when the researchers manipulated the test context.  
Test context in this experiment was retrieval instructions which affected how 
participants initiated and carried out retrieval processes during the recognition test. Where they 
used the same instructions as that of the first experiment (to identify which items were old or 
seen before), they observed equal activation in the right APC and DPLC, consistent with the 
retrieval attempt hypothesis. However, when the context of the experiment was changed 
(biased instructions directing participants to look for a few old words among many new words 
or vice versa) more activation in the right PFC was observed instead. Therefore, Wagner et al. 
(1998) demonstrated that due to a change in context within the experiment, participants used 
different retrieval strategies which in turn reflected a difference in activation in the right PFC. 
The PFC along with the hippocampus, are therefore both critical structures in the processing of 
contextual information and the retrieval of episodic memories. 
Neuroscience of the self and context 
The hippocampus and PFC comprise part of a medial temporal-parietal core network 
thought to be involved not only in episodic and semantic memory of the past, but in processes 
such as in self-projection (Buckner & Carroll, 2007) or mental time travel (Tulving, 2002). These 
processes refer to ideas such as scene construction or projection of the self into a spatial 
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context, and are common in imagination. Most commonly, imagination is studied in terms of 
imagining the future, however it can also refer to other forms of imagination such as re-
imagining the past, or creating new imagined scenes in the present, and does not necessarily 
have a temporal contingency (for a review, see Schacter et al., 2012). For example, Hassabis, 
Kumaran, and Maguire (2007) conducted an fMRI study supporting the use of structures in the 
core network during the recall of previous episodic memories and the construction of imagined 
scenes and objects both previously imagined and newly constructed. Most notably, the 
hippocampus, posterior cingulate cortex, anterior medial PFC, and precuneus were engaged 
during the imagination (reconstruction and construction) of objects and scenes. Furthermore, 
patients with amnesia due to bilateral hippocampal damage were impaired in vividly imagining 
new experiences (Hassabis et al., 2007) possibly due to impairments with scene construction or 
imagining self-relevant future events. These results lend support to the fact that structures 
known to be involved in episodic memory also play a role in different types of imagination and 
complex scene construction.  
Building on the idea of the core network as being implicated in imagination of spatially 
complex scenes, it has been proposed that these structures support the scene construction 
theory (SCT) (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007). Scene construction is the maintenance and 
elaboration of a mentally generated scene or event. By way of the hippocampus, scene 
construction acts a foundation for variety of functions such as episodic memory, spatial 
navigation, imagination and future thinking (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007). A similar hypothesis, 
the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter & Addis, 2007), implies that the same 
core network supports both remembering the past and imagination of the future through the 
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constructive nature of memory (Bartlett, 1932). By using episodic and semantic details from the 
past, the core network can recombine these details into future thoughts by imagination. One 
other hypothesis regarding the core network and its link to imagining the future concerns that 
of self-projection (Buckner & Carroll, 2007). Self-projection is one form of prospection, or 
thinking about the future, which may include imagining oneself carrying out tasks or making 
plans for future goals. Buckner and Carroll (2007) have also found support for this form of 
imagination and the connection among remembering the past and taking the perspective of 
others in the activation of the core network. Overall, there are several hypotheses regarding the 
basis for imagination, however, they all agree that the network that supports not only episodic 
memory but that of generative imagination is the same. 
Seeing that there is a large component of the self in imagination, is not surprising that 
we often take this perspective when thinking about plans for future actions or remembering 
episodic details from our past. The medial PFC (mPFC), a lesser studied structure from the core 
network, seems to play a role in imagination and memory for self-relevant objects (Lin, Horner, 
Bisby, & Burgess, 2015). Noting the role of the mPFC in self-referential thoughts regarding 
subjective values of chosen objects, Lin et al. (2015) conducted an fMRI study demonstrating 
mPFC activation in response to imagined objects that were relevant to an imagined context. 
They created conditions whereby participants imagined a state of need (thirstiness, coldness, 
hunger, and tiredness) and a spatial scene and then viewed objects that were either congruent 
or incongruent with their imagined context. mPFC activation was seen to represent the value of 
an object, along with participants showing greater recognition memory for items congruent to 
their imagined context (items with greater value). This is relevant as it not only shows that the 
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core network is again involved in scene construction and imagination, but that indices of 
memory can be influenced by the subjective value of an object. That is, objects that have more 
personal relevance and value (those congruent with the personal state of need) were better 
remembered.  
In terms of an encoding strategy, mnemonics related to the self in imagination seem 
beneficial for recall. Grilli and Glisky (2010) demonstrated the self-imagination effect (SIE) in 
patients with neurological damage as well as healthy controls, whereby imagining an event from 
the perspective of the self lead to better memory as compared to semantic elaboration. They 
later compared the self-imagination strategy to three other mnemonic techniques (visual 
imagery, semantic elaboration and other-imagining), and found again that memory in 
individuals with neurological damage was significantly better when using the self-imagination 
technique (Grilli & Gilsky, 2011). Their results from a cued-recall test for spatial locations paired 
with objects even held after a 30 minute long delay, with self-imagination generating higher 
recall for the locations.  
Overall, we can see that the process of memory, imagination and the self overlap and 
share an underlying neural network. Scene construction and the effect of context as well as self-
projection and self-relevance come together in the generative power of imagination to 
influence memory. In the following experiments of this thesis, we attempted to capitalize on the 
power of self-relevant imagination and scene construction as ways to improve recall after a 
physical context change, which may be due to common processing by the underlying core 
network of the brain. 
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Implications of Imagined Contexts 
As mentioned previously, mental reinstatement of an original environment was helpful 
for individuals trying to remember details about crimes they witnessed. Reinstating an 
environment that cannot be physically accessed in the moment may also have other benefits, 
especially in the areas of mental illness, aging or education. For example, more salient 
environments with specific physical features could be designed for aging individuals that may be 
easily mentally reinstated when needed. As well, any student would be glad to benefit from 
reinstatement of their study context during an examination without the physical (and 
impossible) effort of actually being there. 
We have seen that self-imagined contexts seem to be an effective memory mnemonic in 
individuals with neurological damage and even healthy controls in improving recall (Grilli & 
Glisky, 2010; Grilli & Gilsky, 2011). The application of imagined contexts to other areas of 
memory research may also be helpful to individuals who are undergoing therapy for various 
psychological disorders. For example, individuals with anxiety disorders (most notably post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)), depression, and schizophrenia may demonstrate inflexibility 
in certain behaviours such as intrusive thoughts or memories that are separate from the current 
physical context (Maren et al., 2013). It has been suggested that PTSD may be an example of a 
psychological disorder whereby individuals either have inappropriate contextual processing or 
the reduced ability to use contextual cues, and has been studied by looking at extinction 
processes and activation of critical structures such as the hippocampus, amygdala and 
ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) (Milad et al., 2009; Rougemount-Bücking et al., 2011).  
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An extinction paradigm is a classical conditioning method where the association 
between a CS that has been associated with a US (aversive stimulus) is undone by repeatedly 
presenting the CS without the US, and is a technique used in exposure therapy to treat PTSD. 
Milad et al. (2009) and Rougemount-Bücking et al. (2011) used this paradigm along with 
contextual information to test the activation of different structures known to be impaired in 
PTSD. Firstly, a CS (light) was presented in one context (context A) along with the US (shock) 
until a fear response (CR, skin conductance response) was acquired. Then, in extinction training, 
the CS was presented in another context (context B) without the presentation of the US, thus 
making context B a safe context while context A was considered a dangerous context. Results 
revealed that participants with PTSD had impaired recall of the extinction memory and 
subsequent increases in fMRI activation in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) along 
with less activation in the hippocampus and vmPFC (Milad et al., 2009; Rougemount-Bücking et 
al., 2011). Normally, the vmPFC is known to exert inhibitory control over the amygdala 
(Rozenkranz & Grace, 2002) and should make use of context cues (i.e., the safe context B) in 
order to repress fear responses, however its decreased activation in patients with PTSD seems 
to suggest otherwise (Rougemount-Bücking et al., 2011). Therefore, based on the pattern of 
results with structures known to be involved in contextual processing, fear extinction deficits in 
individuals with PTSD may reflect difficulty with learning to use contextual cues in the inhibition 
of inappropriate fear responses. 
Since imagined contexts have so far been demonstrated to be effective in protecting 
against context-dependent forgetting (Brinegar et al., 2013; Masicampo & Sahakyan, 2014), it is 
also useful to note their portable nature. Imagined contexts are portable in that they do not 
UNRELIABILITY OF IMAGINED CONTEXT EFFECTS IN RECALL                  32 
 
depend on the actual physical context and can thus be used anywhere. For example, there may 
be a case where extinction to a fear response is learned in one context, but it may not 
generalize to a context different from the extinction context. In terms of therapy, this may be 
difficult for the patient as they do not always remain in the safe context and the effects of 
context-dependent forgetting due to context change may cause the re-emergence of previously 
extinct behaviours, emotions, or memories. Thus, if an imagined context is used during therapy, 
regardless of the physical context the individual changes to, they may be able to mentally 
reinstate the safe imagined context. Figuring out how to overcome context-dependent 
forgetting is therefore an important phenomenon to investigate for its practical benefits. 
The Absence of Context Effects 
Seeing as context effects are not always reliable in both recognition and recall tests, it 
may be helpful to look more closely at conditions in which context effects failed to be elicited 
and why this was the case. For context effects to impact memory, the environmental 
information must first be incorporated into the memory trace and later be relevant to the user 
when probing memory for the desired information. Drawing on Glenberg’s (1997) 
environmental suppression theory, Smith and Vela (2001) mentioned three hypotheses that 
could account for the absence of environmental context effects. The environmental suppression 
theory states that information about the immediate environment is automatically processed 
unless one makes efforts to suppress the contextual information (Glenberg, 1997). The 
environment can be supressed in three ways, through overshadowing, outshining, or mental 
reinstatement (Smith & Vela, 2001). Overshadowing and outshining supress contextual 
information at encoding and retrieval respectively, while mental reinstatement overcomes 
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effects of the current environment by mentally reinstating a different environment. In these 
processes, context effects, that of worse memory in a different rather than same context, are 
negated, as the immediate influence of the environmental context is suppressed.  
Some studies have attempted to manipulate various aspects of environmental contexts 
in ways that increase or decrease their salience but have still failed to find an effect of context 
where others have succeeded. Smith (2014) suggests that there may be other elements of a 
context such as stimuli and apparatus modality that researchers should be aware of when 
thinking about how individuals construct contexts. For example, Reed (1931) ran some 
reinstatement studies where she varied body posture and response modality as two types of 
contextual conditions. Participants were directed to learn material while in one body position 
(sitting or standing) and were either returned to the same or different posture during recall. In 
another experiment they were to encode the material in a written or oral way, and at test were 
asked to produce the information using the same or different modality. In both experiments, no 
effect of context was found. It was attributed to the fact that in both of these types of contexts, 
individuals are fairly adept at producing and remembering information without being so 
disturbed by them as they constantly change body positions and learning modalities throughout 
the day. Therefore, the context in this case may have been overshadowed or outshone because 
attention was not directed towards these automatic positions and modalities, making them 
irrelevant cues during test.  
Fernandez and Glenberg (1985) also presented eight experiments that looked at various 
aspects of stimuli that did not affect recall when context was changed from study to test. They 
make a number of suggestions for why context information is not encoded or used at test, most 
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notably repetition of stimuli presentation, stimuli difficulty, and self-generated retrieval 
techniques. For stimuli repetition, although increasing the number of presentations of stimuli 
resulted in overall better memory, when participants changed rooms from study to test, no 
context effect was found for recall. Even changing the experimenters present in the rooms or 
changing retention intervals did not make any difference in distinguishing the contexts. They 
also suggest that stimuli difficulty may detract from using environmental context cues during 
encoding as cognitive demands would be increased and less attention would be paid to 
contextual information. However, in their experiment using both difficult-to-remember and 
easy-to-remember word pairs, neither influenced recall after context change. Another 
hypothesis that seems quite likely is that participants do not use environmental contextual cues 
because they are using their own self-generated cues or techniques. For example, closing one’s 
eyes or averting one’s gaze during encoding may be a way to shut out environmental influences 
and improve memory (Glenberg, Schroeder, & Robertson, 1998).  
To examine this, Fernandez and Glenberg (1985) designed an experiment where 
participants were either more or less likely to rely on environmental context instead of their 
own techniques, by having them learn pre-made sentences or generate their own sentences 
using the to-be-remembered words. The generation of their own sentences was expected to 
induce participants to use their own internal organizations to remember the words, while the 
learning of pre-made sentences was expected to rely on external contextual information. 
However, neither of these conditions influenced participant’s ability to use contextual 
information as no context effect was found when participants changed to a different room for 
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test. These results further highlight that features of stimuli should be further investigated as to 
their influence on contextual utilization.  
In a similar study looking at dependency on environmental context, Wilhite (1991) 
tested participant’s recall for a list of random words or a preconstructed paragraph. In this 
situation, he assumed that learning the random words would need to depend on the 
environmental context since no other cues were available, whereas memory for the paragraph 
would not depend on the environment as its organizational structure served as a more effective 
cue. Participants were directed to a room where they learned either the word list or paragraph 
and then remained in the same room or switched to a different room for recall. No effect of 
context was found in paragraph recall, as expected, however there was a significant effect of 
context on word list recall. Surprisingly, this effect was not in the usual direction. Participants 
recalled significantly more words in the different context than in the same context, which 
Wilhite (1991) refers to as the negative environmental reinstatement effect. This pattern of 
results although unusual, has occurred before, although results did not reach significance 
(Fernandez & Glenberg, 1985; McDaniel, Anderson, Einstein, & O'Halloran, 1989). Wilhite 
(1991) suggests that this is perhaps due to cue overload, where the same context word list 
group had to rely on overloaded cues during retrieval. During encoding, both different and same 
context groups would have overloaded cues while learning the words, however, during retrieval, 
the different context group would not have access to the overloaded cues and thus their 
performance was higher. 
Lastly, a group of studies raises questions on the effect of context in education and 
classroom learning. If it was true that context change from study to test negatively affected 
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memory, we would expect that over the years, students would perform poorly in school. This 
generally doesn’t seem to be the case however. When students were tested in a different 
classroom than the one used for class lectures, they performed similarly to those who were 
tested in the lecture classroom (Farnsworth, 1985; Saufley, Otaka, & Bavaresco, 1985). Although 
the classroom seems like a more ecologically valid place to test context effects, there are many 
factors which can account for the absence of context effects. Questions on tests may require 
different learning or memory processes than those used in experiments; they may be more 
elaborative or associated with various study contexts outside of the lecture room. The fact that 
students typically study in different environments may decontextualize the study information, 
and in fact their memory may improve, such as with the multiple room manipulation (Smith, 
1982; Smith, 1984). Context effects were also absent in studies with medical students who 
studied medical words, patient case studies, and random words and were tested in different 
locations such as the patient’s bedside or the operating theatre (Koens, Cate, & Custers, 2003; 
Conveney, Switzer, Corrigan, & Redmond, 2013). Again, these authors note that participants 
may have used their own cues at test, decontextualizing the environment. Furthermore, the 
environments and some study words are familiar to these students which would have further 
reduced the influence of the environmental context. Although results like these are not 
encouraging for the finding of context effects, it makes sense that we are able to retain a lot of 
information even when switching through familiar and unfamiliar environments, varied body 
postures and modes of information input and output.  
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New Directions 
Looking through the wealth of information discovered regarding the presence and 
absence of context effects, we can see that physical context effects for recall tests are overall 
quite robust. Examinations of the effect of imagined contexts on recall however is less well 
known and provides an interesting area to investigate. So far, imagined contexts seem to be a 
type of context which may act in a similar way to physical contexts, in that participants who 
reinstate the mental encoding context at test benefit in the same way that reinstatement of the 
physical context does to aid memory. This type of context potentially has many benefits not only 
in furthering our understanding of context effects, but also practically, as seen in cases of 
eyewitness studies. The use of mental reinstatement may also impact fields such as mental 
illness, aging and memory and even education. Understanding when context effects are present 
and absent may help to develop these fields. 
The underlying neural network that connects memory, context, and imagination is also 
interesting as it supports not only these functions but that of self-related memory. The focus on 
the self in context-dependent memory is a new direction and has the potential to facilitate or 
even enhance memory in imagined contexts. Looking at studies that employed techniques 
which allowed participants to encode information in a self-referential manner and which saw 
benefits in memory performance, we proposed in this thesis to expand this concept to imagined 
contexts. Type of context plays a major role in influencing whether effects are present or 
absent, and self-relevant contexts may be a type that is also effective. Not only might self-
relevant contexts be easier to construct due to their familiarity, but they may act as a stronger 
cue by this effect. Therefore, the novel position we took in this thesis was to bring the 
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understanding of imagined contexts and self-related information in neuroscience together in 
order to examine the makings of an effective context. 
Overview of Experiments 
To further examine context effects, and particularly the impact of self-relevant imagined 
or mentally reinstated contexts, four experiments were conducted using recall for lists of 
random words. This study aimed to replicate previous results that found a clear effect of context 
when context was global, incidental, and extrinsic. We used rooms located in Wilfrid Laurier 
University as the environmental contexts, and a reinstatement paradigm similar to that used by 
Smith et al. (1978) and Smith (1979). Participants were presented with a list of words in one 
room and were tested for recall in either the same or different room. We expected to find an 
effect of physical context, in that participants who remained in the same context during test 
would recall more words than those that changed to a different room.  
Another hypothesis we examined concerns the effectiveness of imagined contexts in 
reducing context-dependent forgetting when they were mentally reinstated at test. Building on 
studies conducted by Brinegar et al. (2013) and Masicampo and Sahakyan (2014), we developed 
contexts that were either based on a provided photo or generated by participants themselves. 
Participants were directed to imagine an environment while learning a set of words in one room 
and were then brought to another room where they were asked to mentally reinstate their 
imagined context during recall. A physical change in rooms was expected to cause context-
dependent forgetting, however, with an imagined context held constant between both physical 
contexts, we predicted that participants would perform similarly to groups who did not change 
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contexts. This manipulation is similar to the technique of preinstatement used by Brinegar et al., 
2013. 
Lastly, we wanted to test one aspect of imagined contexts, that being self-relevant 
imagined contexts. Determining what type of contexts are best reinstated or easily generated by 
participants may be beneficial to advancing our understanding of the way participants mentally 
represent environmental contexts, and what sort of features or associations are most 
prominent. Drawing inspiration from studies looking at the neuroscience of memory, context, 
and the self in the underlying core network, we proposed that self-relevant imagined contexts 
may be more meaningful to participants, and thus serve as effective environmental context 
cues. Participants created self-relevant contexts by imagining a place that was meaningful to 
them or somewhere that they visited often. For example, they may have imagined somewhere 
such as their bedroom or a vacation spot they particularly enjoyed. This condition was 
contrasted with the imagined context using a provided photo as reference instead.  
Overall, four experiments were conducted to examine these hypotheses. The first one 
was designed to replicate basic physical context effects and mental reinstatement. Assuming 
that the first experiment would parallel findings already reported in the literature, the second 
experiment examined type of imagined context with the introduction of the self-relevant 
imagined context. Drawing from the non-significant results obtained from the first two 
experiments, we designed Experiment 3 as a revised version of Experiment 1. We adjusted 
some stimulus properties to better elicit context effects. Experiment 4 followed the non-
significant results of Experiment 3, where we changed the type of experimental paradigm. 
Experiment 4 consisted of an interference paradigm, which is when participants learn one set of 
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material in one context followed by another set of material in a different context and are tested 
on initial material in either the first (same) or second (different) context. The introduction of the 
interfering material in the form of a second word list along with a change in context were 
expected to increase participant’s reliance on environmental cues from the first context. Results 
from this last experiment were also non-significant, adding to previous studies in the literature 
which found context effects unreliable.  
Overall, participants were exposed to a physical context condition or an imagined 
context condition. They learned a set of words in one physical context (room) and either 
changed rooms or stayed in the initial room for a free recall test. Some participants were 
instructed either to imagine a context provided to them in a picture, imagine a self relevant 
context, imagine a previously introduced physical context, or not to imagine any context at all. 
Results obtained demonstrated that there was no effect of physical context, with groups that 
changed contexts performing the same as groups that stayed in the same context. This was 
regardless of whether groups were directed to imagine a context and reinstate it during test. 
Explorations for why this pattern of results was found in these experiments as well as in 
previous literature are considered in the general discussion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNRELIABILITY OF CONTEXT EFFECTS IN RECALL      41 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Experiment 1 
Introduction 
Experiments 1 and 2 were designed in tandem, with the expectation that Experiment 1 
would confirm basic physical and imagined context effects on recall, while Experiment 2 
expanded upon imagined contexts with the introduction of a self-relevant imagined context 
group.  
In Experiment 1, basic physical context effects were expected to manifest as better recall 
in the same context group as compared to the different context group. Better recall was also 
expected in the group that reinstated the imagined context during retrieval. This experiment 
was designed to replicate the results of Brinegar et al. (2013) and Masicampo and Sahakyan 
(2014), where the reinstatement of an imagined context, even in a physically different context, 
would protect against context-dependent forgetting. 
Three context condition study groups were created to examine the basic effect of 
context and imagined context on recall, group same physical context (SPC), group different 
physical context (DPC), and group same imagined context (SIC). Groups were created based on 
two general characteristics; context type and whether they changed contexts or not. Context 
types were physical context or imagined context, while the context change was either different 
or the same. The experimental design can be found in Table 1.  
All groups began in one of the physical contexts (Lab, also referred to as context A) and 
listened to a set of words for which their recall would later be tested. If they were in the 
imagination context group, they were given additional instructions for an imagination task. 
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Groups then either changed physical contexts to the Office (context B) or remained where they 
were to complete the free recall task.  
Method 
Participants: A total of 48 students between the ages of 17 and 27 (M = 18.9, SD = 2.13; 
40 females, 8 males) at Wilfrid Laurier University participated in this study, with 16 participants 
randomly allotted to each of the three groups (SPC, DPC, and SIC) and tested individually by the 
researcher. The number of participants in each group was kept at 16 for each following 
experiment in this study. Since participants were tested individually, 16 in each of the three 
groups was determined to be a manageable number for the researcher. Furthermore, in order 
to demonstrate an appropriate level of power in the experiments, the number of participants 
was similar to those used in studies with a similar design (Smith, 1979; Masicampo & Sahakyan, 
2014). 
Participants were recruited through the PREP (Psychology Research Experience Program) 
system and were compensated in the form of credits towards their eligible psychology course. 
This study was approved by the Wilfrid Laurier University Research Ethics Board and students 
signed a consent form (Appendix A) before beginning the study. 
Apparatus and Materials: All procedures were carried out in either one or both of two 
rooms in the university. The room where all participants began the study, and where group SPC 
stayed for the entirety of the tasks, was context A, the Memory Laboratory in the Science 
Research Centre (Figure 1). The Lab consisted of a very small individual cubicle with an IBM 
compatible computer, a 17” colour monitor, keyboard, mouse, and JVC HA-X570 headphones. 
The cubicle had medium-grey coloured walls and was left dark with the lights turned off. 
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Participants had just enough space to sit in front of the monitor as the door to the cubicle was 
directly behind the chair.  
The second room where some participants completed testing and recorded their 
responses, was context B, an Office in the Science Building (Figure 2). The Office is larger than 
the cubicle with two desks, including one which contained an identical computer, monitor, 
keyboard, mouse, and headphones as the Lab. The room was brightly lit by overhead lighting 
and some smaller string lights, and had bookcases filled with books and papers lining one of the 
walls. Several colourful, large-framed pictures and paper lanterns hung on adjacent walls. Lastly, 
a scented fragrance permeated the space which was also generally stuffy, due to poorer air 
circulation as compared to the Lab which was cooler in temperature. These distinctions worked 
to provide a noticeable sense of ambience which differed from the Lab.  
The picture of a mountain pathway (Figure 3) which was shown to participants in the 
imagination condition (SIC) was drawn from a collection of natural images from Hancock, 
Baddeley, & Smith (1992) which consists of a variety of natural outdoor and indoor scenes. The 
original photo is in black and white and 256 x 256 pixels but was enlarged to 660 x 660 pixels for 
ease of viewing on the computer screen. 
Stimuli in this experiment were two sets of 20 words; List 1 (L1, Appendix B) and List 2 
(L2, Appendix B), and were randomly drawn from the Auditory Toronto Noun Pool compiled by 
Kahana (n.d.) (http://memory.psych.upenn.edu/Word_Pools). These words are taken from the 
Toronto Noun Pool, which in turn are a subset of the Toronto Word Pool (Friendly, Franklin, 
Hoffman, & Rubin, 1982). Stimuli were two-syllable words with average values of frequency and 
concreteness. Stimuli were presented and recorded using SuperLab 4.5 (Cedrus Corp.). 
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Filler tasks were simple math questions that were completed by typing the correct 
answer on the keyboard. Questions were in the format of addition, subtraction, multiplication 
and division of two simple numbers, for example the format 𝑥 + 𝑦 = 𝑧. Participants recorded 
their responses to the recall test on a piece of paper.  
Procedure: All three groups were brought to the Lab cubicle and were left alone to 
complete the encoding portion of the experiment on the computer. It began with introducing a 
tone (an elevator ding sound) to participants, telling them the tone would signal the end of a 
task throughout the experiment. The tone was presented after a set of instructions or 
presentation of stimuli as well as any task requiring input by participants.  
Group SIC was then asked to view the image of a mountain scene for 2 minutes while 
imagining themselves within the scene with their eyes closed. A tone signalled the end of the 
task where they could open their eyes. For groups SPC and DPC during this time, they were 
given simple math questions to answer instead of viewing the image. Then, for all three groups, 
an auditory word list (either L1 or L2) was presented through the headphones attached to the 
computer. Participants were asked to listen to and remember the words in the list. An additional 
imagination instruction was given to group SIC before the presentation of the word list. They 
were asked to imagine themselves within the scene they viewed and imagined previously as 
they listened to the words in the list. Following the word list presentation, groups exited the 
cubicle, with group SPC coming to sit just outside the cubicle with the researcher in the Lab and 
groups DPC and SIC following the researcher out of the Lab and to the Office.  
Since the walk to the Office took approximately 2 minutes, group SPC was engaged in 
casual conversation with the researcher to match this time and prevent rehearsal of the word 
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list. Groups DPC and SIC were also engaged in conversation with the researcher during the walk. 
After this delay, group SPC was sent back into the Lab cubicle while groups DPC and SIC took a 
seat in the Office to begin the recall task. Groups put on headphones attached to the computer 
where they received instructions about the recall task. They were then given a piece of paper 
and 3 minutes to write down any words that they could recall from before. Group SIC was given 
an additional instruction to re-imagine that they were in the previous imagined scene while 
performing the recall test. A tone signalled the end of this task and concluded the experiment. 
More detailed instructions for each study group can be found in Appendix A. 
Design: A between-subjects design was used to examine the effect of the independent 
variable, context condition, at three levels (SPC, DPC and SIC) on the dependent variables, recall 
and intrusions. Another analysis looked at the effect of word list (L1 and L2) on the two 
dependent variables. 
Results 
Recall was measured as the number of words participants correctly remembered. Words 
were scored using two criteria, a strict or lax criteria. Words were deemed correct according to 
the strict criteria if they were exactly as those heard on the list they received. Correct words 
based on the lax criteria were counted if they were phonologically similar (e.g., trader instead of 
the correct word traitor, or weather instead of feather). Spelling did not matter in either of 
these criteria as long as the words were identifiable. Intrusions, the recollection of words not on 
the list, were also scored. Means for strict and lax recall as well as number of intrusions are 
reported in Table 2. 
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Word List. In order to asses if word list difficulty had an impact on recall, a one-way 
ANOVA was conducted for word list (L1 and L2) on recall. It was revealed that there was a 
significant impact of word list on strict recall F(1, 46) = 12.02, p = .001, η2= .21, and lax recall F 
(1, 46) = 6.41, p = .015, η2 = .12. Participants who received L1 recalled more strict words (M = 
8.73, SD = 4.10), than those that received L2 (M = 5.58, SD = 2.00). Participants hearing L1 also 
recalled more lax words (M = 9.18, SD = 4.15) than those that heard L2 (M = 6.85, SD = 2.05). 
There was no effect of word list on intrusions F(1, 46) = 0.96, p = .33, η2 = .020.  
Correct recall. As recall differed between the two lists, word list was included along with 
context condition in the analysis of recall. A 2 (L1 vs. L2) × 3 (SPC, DPC and SIC) ANOVA was 
conducted for number of words recalled (strict and lax criteria) and number of intrusions. A 
main effect was identified for word list and strict recall F(1, 42) = 11.9, p = .001, ηp
2  = .22 as well 
as lax recall F(1, 42) = 6.15, p = .017, ηp
2  = .13. The ANOVA revealed no interaction of word list × 
context condition for strict recall F(2, 42) = 0.21, p = .81, ηp
2  = .010, or lax recall F(2, 42) = 0.19, p 
= .83, ηp
2  = .009. Neither was there a main effect of context condition for strict recall F(2, 42) = 
0.57, p = .57, ηp
2  = .027, or lax recall F(2, 42) = 0.23, p = .80, ηp
2  = .011.  
Intrusions. There was no interaction of word list × context condition for number of 
intrusions F(2,42) = 0.23, p = .80, ηp
2  = .011. There was also no main effect of context condition 
for intrusions F(2, 42) = 0.93, p = .40, ηp
2  = .042, as well as no main effect of word list F(1, 42) = 
0.53, p = .47, ηp
2  = .013. 
Discussion 
The aim of this experiment was to replicate the general context effect, whereby groups 
that complete a free recall task in the same environment where they first encode information 
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perform better than groups that recall words in a different environment. Furthermore, the 
reinstatement of imagined contexts at recall was expected to result in better recall as well, as 
found in previous studies (Brinegar et al., 2013; Masicampo & Sahakyan, 2014). It was predicted 
that groups SPC and SIC would recall more words than group DPC, and that group SIC may even 
recall more words than group SPC. Masicampo and Sahakyan (2014) demonstrated that 
imagining a context different than the one physically present, because of the mental effort 
involved, was beneficial to memory regardless of the testing environment. Thus, it was possible 
that group SIC, who had to mentally generate their imagined context, may have remembered 
more words than group SPC who did not imagine anything at all.  
The non-significant results of Experiment 1 demonstrate a failure to find an effect of 
context on recall. That is, there was no difference in number of words remembered whether 
groups stayed in or changed contexts from encoding to retrieval. Although recall was assessed 
using two scoring criteria, strict and lax recall, there was no difference between these two 
measures. These results are contrary to most studies examining the effect of context on recall, 
and support those that did not find any effect (e.g., Fernandez & Glenberg, 1985).  
The non-significant effects of context and word list on intrusions is expected, indicating 
that the word lists are composed of reasonably distinct words and that participants were trying 
their best to only write those words in which they could absolutely recall correctly. Non-study 
words did not seem to impede participant’s abilities to recall actual study words during test.  
The significance of word list on recall indicates something else about the strength of the 
word lists however. It could be that since participants who learned L2 recalled less words than 
those that learned L1, L2 might have contained more difficult-to-remember words. Also, word 
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lists were assigned randomly by the computer, where L2 was assigned to 26 participants and L1 
assigned to 22 participants, creating an unequal participant distribution among these two list 
groups. This issue was corrected in Experiment 2 where word lists were counterbalanced among 
the 3 groups. 
Seeing as the overall effect of context was non-significant, there was also no difference 
between imagined (SIC) and non-imagined (SPC and DPC) context groups. The strength of 
imagined contexts to protect against forgetting in any context, even when changed from 
encoding to recall is therefore not as powerful as demonstrated in Masicampo and Sahakyan 
(2014). Something else to note is the attention paid to context during encoding. In other studies 
employing imagination or mental reinstatement, participants were directed to pay close 
attention to their imagined environment, in some cases pointing out actual items by taking their 
photo (Brinegar et al., 2013) or drawing a picture of the context (Smith, 1979) before 
imagination began. Efforts to get participants in the imagination condition SIC to notice their 
environment were included in this experiment; participants were asked to take note of any 
thoughts or sensory experiences they would feel were they actually in the mountain scene. 
However, this exercise may be seemingly less involved than drawing a picture or taking a photo 
of the context, thereby leading to less association of the words to the imagined scene. 
Experiment 2 included some aspects that were more involved in order to increase the salience 
of the imagined contexts.  
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Chapter 3: Experiment 2 
Introduction 
Seeing that Experiment 2 was run directly after and partly during Experiment 1, only a 
small change was made in light of the results of the previous experiment. The word lists were 
counterbalanced among participants so that an even number of participants received each list 
and the possible effect of word list difficulty would be reduced. 
This experiment aimed to identify if self-relevant imagined contexts were more effective 
at protecting against context-dependent forgetting than the imagination of an uninteresting and 
impersonal mountain scene. It was assumed that a basic context effect would have been found 
in Experiment 1, and so the intention was to look more closely at imagined contexts. 
Three new groups were created in this study, all who changed physical contexts and 
constructed or did not construct an imagined context during encoding and retrieval. Group 
different physical context 2 (DPC2) was the same as group DPC from Experiment 1 and 
experienced no manipulation of imagined context. Two imagined context groups were included. 
Group same imagined context 2 (SIC2) was the same as group SIC from Experiment 1. Group 
self-relevant imagined context (SRIC) experienced a different type of imagined context than 
SIC2.  
A self-relevant imagined context was a personal and unique context that SRIC 
participants were asked to mentally generate. These were contexts that participants would find 
particularly vivid and easy to construct, that served an important meaning, or was somewhere 
they visited frequently. For example, they were asked to imagine a room in their house (e.g., 
their bedroom), somewhere they often visited (e.g., a school classroom), or a highly meaningful 
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or stimulating environment (e.g., a vacation spot they enjoyed). As with group SIC2, the 
researcher directed participants to note any unique features or sensory experiences that would 
be noticeable in that environment, so that participants could imagine a vivid scene. 
The experimental design is presented in Table 1. All groups began in the Lab where they 
listened to either L1 or L2 (as used in Experiment 1) and were either instructed to imagine a 
scene (as shown in Figure 3, or self-generated) or not during encoding. All groups then moved 
to the Office where they performed a free recall test with additional imagination reinstatement 
instructions being given to groups SIC2 and SRIC. 
Method 
Participants: An additional 54 participants were drawn from the PREP system and were 
given course credit for their participation. Six participants were not included in the analysis, four 
because the study was interrupted before recall could be completed, one due to a failure to 
follow instructions, and one because of prior knowledge of the experiment. Therefore, 48 total 
participants were evaluated with ages ranging from 17 to 29 (M = 18.9, SD = 2.32), including 39 
females and 9 males. Sixteen participants were randomly assigned to each of the three study 
groups (DPC2, SIC2, and SRIC) and were tested individually.  
Apparatus and Materials: The same rooms (Lab and Office) were again used as the two 
distinct context locations. Two additional materials were added in the form of two, 1-item, 5-
point scales. The first scale that was presented to groups SIC2 and SRIC asked the question, 
“How vivid/clear is your imagined environment at this time?” with possible answers being, “1 – 
not vivid at all (unclear), 2 – vaguely vivid, 3 – neither clear nor unclear, 4 – mostly vivid, and 5 – 
very vivid (clear)”. The second scale was presented to group DPC2 and asked the question, “How 
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tired do you feel right now?” with possible answers being, “1 – exhausted, 2 – tired, 3 – neither 
tired nor energized (neutral), 4 – alert, and 5 – alert (energized)”. Participants again recorded all 
responses on the computer and a piece of paper. 
Procedure: Detailed study instructions are presented in Appendix A. All three groups 
were brought into the Lab cubicle where they began the encoding phase and were familiarized 
with the tone that signalled the end of tasks. Groups SIC2 and SRIC were given a 1 minute 
imagination task where they were either shown the mountain scene (Figure 3) or asked to 
construct a self-relevant imagined scene in their mind (group SRIC). Participants were instructed 
to close their eyes and imagine that they were within the imagined scene as well as take note of 
any relevant details or sensations that they would experience were they actually in that 
environment. A tone signalled when they could open their eyes. They were then given 3 
minutes to write down a short descriptive paragraph about the scene they imagined. Following 
the paragraph task, they were again given 1 minute to fully visualize their scene. During this 5 
minute imagination task, group DPC completed simple math questions instead of imagining a 
scene. 
L1 or L2 was then presented to each participant through the headphones and they were 
asked to listen and remember the words. Groups SIC2 and SRIC were given additional 
instructions to imagine themselves within their previously imagined scene as they listened to 
the word list. The 5-point scales were presented to participants three times throughout the 
word list; at the beginning, after a presentation of 10 words, and at the end of the list. Groups 
SIC2 and SRIC indicated the level of vividness of their imagined scene at the time on a scale of 1 
(unclear) to 5 (clear), while group DPC2 indicated their level of fatigue from 1 (exhausted) to 5 
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(alert). Groups indicated their responses by pressing the corresponding number key on the 
keyboard. The scale presented to group DPC2 was meant as a filler task to match the time and 
disruption of groups SIC2 and SRIC spent filling in their questionnaires. Following the word list 
presentation, all groups exited the Lab and moved to the Office, engaging in casual conversation 
with the researcher along the way. 
In the Office, each group was given 3 minutes to write down any words they could 
remember from their word list. Groups SIC2 and SRIC were asked to re-imagined themselves in 
their previous imagined context during the task. Following the recall task, these two groups 
were given 3 minutes and asked to write another short descriptive paragraph detailing the 
scene as it appeared in their mind during recall. Group DPC2 again completed math questions 
instead of the paragraph task. A tone signalled the end of the paragraph and math exercises, 
and the completion of the experiment.  
Design: A between-subjects design was used to examine the effect of context at three 
levels (DPC2, SIC2, and SRIC) on the dependent variables, recall (based on the strict and lax 
criterion) and intrusions. A second analysis compared the effect of word list on the dependent 
variables. Another analysis examined the effect of imagined context conditions (SIC2 and SRIC) 
on average values of vividness ratings.   
Results 
Word List. A one-way ANOVA performed on word list and recall indicated no effect of 
word list (L1 or L2) on strict recall F(1, 46) = 0.26, p = .62, η2 = .006, nor lax recall F(1, 46) = 0.40, 
p = .53, η2 = .009. Groups recalled an average of 6.85 (SD = 3.11) and 7.58 (SD = 3.18) words for 
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strict and lax criteria respectively. There was also no effect of word list on intrusions F(1, 46) = 
0.84, p = .36, η2 = .018. 
Correct recall. Mean number of words recalled and number of intrusions are presented 
in Table 3. A one-way ANOVA conducted on the effect of context condition on strict recall 
revealed no effect of context F(2, 45) = 0.37, p = .70, η2 = .016. There was also a non-significant 
effect of context on lax recall F(2,45) = 0.52, p = .60, η2 = .023. There was a non-significant effect 
of context condition on number of intrusions F(2, 45) = 0.16, p = .85, η2 = .007. Although non-
significant, group means for strict and lax recall were in the direction favouring same context 
effects with imagination groups SIC2 and SRIC recalling more words than the different context 
group DPC2. Also, group SIC2 recalled the most words of any group. 
Vividness ratings. Means of the vividness ratings for imagination groups SIC2 and SRIC 
are presented in Table 4. Averages of all three measures for each group are also presented. A 
one-way ANOVA was conducted on context conditions SIC2 and SRIC and average vividness 
ratings. There was no significant difference in vividness ratings across context conditions F(1, 30) 
= 1.02, p = .32, η2 = .033.   
Discussion 
No significant effect of word list on recall was detected in this experiment, indicating 
that participants recalled words from each list to a similar extent. Notably, the mean number of 
intrusions were also low for all groups (Table 3) and so words in the lists may be equally 
distinguishable and memorable to participants.  
Again, no effect of context nor a reliable effect of mental reinstatement was found. 
However, means were in a direction that would be expected were there a context effect, with 
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better recall in the same context reinstatement groups (SIC2 and SRIC) compared to the 
different context group (DPC2). Also, similar to the results found by Masicampo and Sahakyan 
(2014) where groups that imagined a previously visited context at test recalled more than the 
transformed context A group (A’), group SIC2 recalled more than group SRIC. Group SRIC is 
similar in some ways to group A’, in that both had to generate a context that was not present 
using their own imagination. Group SIC2 on the other hand is similar to the other imagination 
groups in their study. Where these other groups imagined a previously visited environment, 
group SIC2 viewed a photo which is similar to viewing a previously visited room. Although it was 
anticipated that self-relevant contexts may invoke better recall than impersonal contexts when 
reinstated, means favour the opposite direction, such as those discovered by Masicampo and 
Sahakyan (2014).  
Some reasons for why context effects were absent in this and the first experiment were 
examined, and an improved version of Experiment 1 was designed for Experiment 3. It was 
determined that in order to create context effects, we needed to increase the reliance of groups 
on environmental cues. Since it is assumed that environmental cues are utilized when other 
more salient cues are unavailable, we focused on making the environment more necessary for 
recall. Self-relevant contexts were also not examined further.  
It may be that imagination groups did not find their imagined context salient enough and 
so did not benefit from imagined environmental cues. In some other studies where effects were 
found for mental reinstatement, more effort was placed into getting participants to vividly 
encode their imagined scene through reminders during the experiment (Smith, 1979; Brinegar 
et al., 2013). In this experiment, although we provided participants with many opportunities to 
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imagine their scene by way of the paragraph and vividness rating tasks, participants may not 
have been attending to any specific details of their environments. Generally, the elements that 
make up a context or environment are noted as important cues that must be mentally 
reinstated during re-imagination at recall in order to aid memory performance (Brinegar et al., 
2013; Masicampo & Sahakyan, 2014). Thus, a task in Experiment 3 was introduced that asked 
participants to write down actual details of their environment before performing the recall test. 
This is similar to the method used by Smith (1979) where participants drew a picture of the 
future encoding room to note specific details. Furthermore, pictures of the imagined context 
were presented at the beginning and end of the word list to visually remind participants of the 
actual scene.  
One main issue with the presentation of the mountain scene to SIC and SIC2 participants 
in Experiments 1 and 2 could be that they found the image dull and difficult to imagine. The 
photo presented was in black and white, and although enlarged, was still small and somewhat 
grainy when viewed on the computer. The descriptive paragraph task was used to asses if 
participants were noting details of the scene and that they were holding a consistent image in 
their mind during encoding and test. Generally, participant’s paragraphs had a consistent 
description noting details of the mountains, the dark atmosphere and a river or path between 
the mountains. In terms of vividness ratings, although non-significant, the ANOVA on imagined 
context condition and average vividness ratings showed that group SRIC rated their context 
slightly more clearly throughout the word list presentation than group SIC2. This is interesting as 
the means for recall demonstrate that group SIC2 recalled slightly more words than group SRIC. 
One would think that the more vivid a scene is, the easier it would be to reinstate and use in 
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recall. However, with the non-significant results it is difficult to understand the relationship 
between vividness of a scene and effectiveness of imagined cues.  
Looking at Table 4, means for each scale value were mostly consistent over time, but 
tended to be somewhat higher in the beginning and drop towards the end. This was expected 
as it is difficult to keep a scene so vividly in mind while listening to words at the same time. 
Although the paragraph and vividness rating tasks showed mostly constant results, participants 
may still have had difficulty immersing themselves in their scene due to lack of details. A new 
photo which was colourful and large (Figure 4) was thus presented to participants in Experiment 
3 in order to overcome a possible lack of salience. In changing these few items to bring 
imagination participant’s attention to their environment and to increase the reliance on 
environmental cues, it was expected that context effects would be more likely due to the 
contrast between physical and imagined contexts.  
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Chapter 4: Experiments 3 and 3b 
Experiment 3 
Introduction 
Experiment 3 was a replication of Experiment 1 with some features changed to make 
imagined environments more salient and to increase overall recall. Seeing that recall levels were 
quite low and variance sometimes large in the previous two experiments, the word list was 
presented twice to increase the overall number of words recalled in all groups. Other efforts to 
improve salience of the imagined environment were implemented through a new picture 
presented to the imagination group, repeated presentation of the picture throughout encoding, 
and a task requiring the imagination group to note specific details of the environment prior to 
recall.  
Another change was made to study and test procedures. In order to maximize the 
difference in physical environments, presentation of stimuli and participant responses in the Lab 
were restricted to the computer while instructions and recall output in the office were oral and 
written, respectively. This was in contrast to the previous two experiments where regardless of 
the context change, all participant instructions and responses were presented on the computer. 
Lastly, an amalgamation of L1 and L2 into L3 was done to create a balanced word list that 
participants could more easily remember. 
Three groups were included which were the same as those in Experiment 1. Group same 
physical context 3 (SPC3), group different physical context 3 (DPC3), and group same imagined 
context 3 (SIC3). All groups followed the same procedure as that in Experiment 1 (see Table 1), 
with some changes noted below.   
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Method 
Participants: Forty-eight participants (37 female, 11 males) ranging from ages 17 to 22 
(M = 18.7, SD = 1.03) were recruited from the PREP system and given course credit for their 
participation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three context condition groups 
(SPC3, DPC3, and SIC3) and tested individually. This study was approved by the Wilfrid Laurier 
University Research Ethics Board and participants signed a consent form (Appendix A) prior to 
participation.  
Apparatus and Materials: The word list for this experiment, list 3 (L3, Appendix B), was 
randomly drawn from the 40 words in L1 and L2 which were used in the first two experiments. 
L3 contained 25 words. The word shower was omitted from the selection as participants often 
confused this word for the similar sounding word sour. The previous picture of a mountain 
scene that was used for the imagined context was replaced with a picture of a colourful beach 
scene (Figure 4). The picture shows a tropical beach with blue water, floating boats, sand, 
several green palm trees, multiple beach chairs, and thatched umbrellas. The same two physical 
contexts from the first two experiments were used again, with the only modification being that 
in the office, the desk containing the computer was covered with a shower curtain. The curtain 
was blue with a design of dispersed green, tropical flowers. The computer was covered as to not 
represent any physical elements from the Lab, and maximize their difference as distinct 
contexts. Stimuli were presented and recorded using the SuperLab 5 program (Cedrus Corp.) 
and a piece of paper. 
Procedure: As in the previous two experiments, groups began in the Lab where they 
received information about the study and were familiarized with the tone that signalled the end 
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of a task on the computer (see Appendix A). Group SIC3 viewed the beach scene and imagined 
themselves within the scene for 2 minutes while groups SPC3 and DPC3 completed simple math 
questions. Groups were then presented with L3 and asked to listen and remember these words. 
Word order presentation was random for each participant with 2 seconds of silence between 
each word. Group SIC3 was asked to imagine themselves in the beach scene while they listened 
to the words. After the word list presentation, the beach scene was briefly presented again to 
group SIC3 for 5 seconds while groups SPC3 and DPC3 viewed a black screen instead. The word 
list was then presented a second time, thus ending the first part of the experiment.  
After this encoding period, participants moved onto the recall test. Groups DPC3 and 
SIC3 moved to the Office while group SPC3 stayed in the Lab and all participants engaged in 
casual conversation with the researcher during this time. Before the recall test, group SIC3 was 
given 2 minutes to write a short list of any details about the beach scene that they could 
visualize. Groups SPC3 and DPC3 again did math questions for these 2 minutes. All groups were 
then asked to write down (DPC3 and SIC3) or type (SPC3) any words they could remember from 
before, with additional instructions given to group SIC3 to re-imagine themselves in the beach 
scene. The recall task took 3 minutes. All instructions given in the office were oral, with 
responses to math questions and recall written on paper while the instructions and recall 
responses in the Lab were delivered by computer.  
Design: A between-subjects design was used was used to evaluate the effect of context 
at three levels (SPC3, DPC3, and SIC3) on number of words recalled (strict and lax scoring 
criteria) as well as number of intrusions. Another analysis looked at the effect of context and 
level of recall (high vs. low) on strict and lax recall.  
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Results 
Correct recall. Table 5 presents the mean number of words recalled in each context 
condition as well as the number of intrusions. Average number of words recalled for each group 
although non-significant, seemed to follow a trend that would be expected if a context effect 
was present. Same context groups SPC3 and SIC3 recalled more words than the different 
context group DPC3, with the imagination group SIC3 recalling the most words under both strict 
and lax scoring criteria. A one-way ANOVA revealed no effect of context on strict recall F(2, 45) = 
1.05, p = .36, η2 = .044 or lax recall F(2, 45) = 1.19, p = .31, η2 = .050. There was also a non-
significant effect of context on intrusions F(2, 45) = 1.57, p = .22, η2 = .065.  
Median split analysis. Seeing that the range in number of words recalled was quite large, 
with a minimum value of 1 word and maximum value of 20 words, a median split analysis based 
on recall scores was performed. A 2 (above median vs. below median) × 3 (SPC3, DPC3, and 
SIC3) ANOVA was performed in order to look at the effect of level of recall (high, above median 
vs. low, below median) and context condition for both strict and lax scoring. 
Mean number of strict words recalled for each context condition above and below the 
median are included in Table 6. The ANOVA for strict recall revealed a main effect of level of 
recall F (1, 42) = 70.5, p < .001, ηp
2  = .63. There was a marginal main effect of context condition 
F(2, 42) = 2.63, p = .084, ηp
2  = .11 with group SIC3 recalling the most words, followed by group 
SPC3 and group DPC3 recalling the least. There was no interaction of context condition × level 
of recall F(2, 42) = 0.38, p = .69, ηp
2  = .018. An ANOVA for level of recall and context condition 
was also performed for lax recall, but results are not reported here due to a negligible 
difference between the two scoring criteria.  
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Discussion 
Efforts to make the imagined environments more salient in this experiment seem to 
have been beneficial for participants. Overall recall was higher than in Experiments 1 and 2, 
most probably due to the repeated presentation of the word list. The non-significant effect of 
context on recall as well as the main effect of context when looking at high levels and low levels 
of recall demonstrate that same context groups recalled more words than the difference 
context group. Furthermore, when comparing the same context groups, the imagination group 
SIC3 recalled more words than the non-imagination group SPC3. These means are in the 
direction that is predicted when context effects are apparent. Efforts to make the imagined 
context more noticeable and useful as a cue using repeated picture presentations and the 
picture description task may have helped participants in group SIC3. Although non-significant, 
the finding that the imagination group performed better than not only the different context 
group (DPC3) but the same context non-imagination group (SPC3), comes closer to results of 
previous imagination studies by Brinegar et al. (2013) and Masicampo & Sahakyan (2014). 
In order to maximize the difference between same and different context groups even 
further, another different context group was created in Experiment 3b. Seeing that the imagined 
context appeared to be salient enough to participants, the non-significant context effects may 
be due to the physical contexts instead. It is possible that the two rooms used as the different 
physical contexts were not distinct enough to participants and when they switched rooms, there 
was not enough of a change for context effects to occur. Many of the basic details and 
associated cues from the first room may be similar to the second room (e.g., desk and chair, 
feeling of being in an experimental room).  
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Although efforts were made to make these two rooms quite different, using room 
decoration, scents and even different response modalities (computer vs. hand written), 
participants may view the two rooms as simply two ordinary indoor school rooms. In the studies 
by Brinegar et al. (2013) and Masicampo and Sahakyan (2014), one of their physical 
environments included an outdoor location. An indoor and outdoor contrast would definitely 
create two distinct environments; however we were unable to create this distinction in our 
following experiment due to weather conditions. Instead, another indoor room that was very 
different in scale from the two previous indoor rooms and which shared some outdoor 
elements was determined to be adequate.  
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Experiment 3b 
Introduction 
Although non-significant, the trend in the means towards what would be expected from 
an effect of context was investigated further in this experiment. It was decided to see if the 
contrast between same and different contexts in Experiment 3 (SPC3 and DPC3) could be 
increased by testing a new different physical context group DPC3b, and comparing it to the 
previous results of group SPC3. In order to create a greater contrast between contexts, the 
different context was changed from the office to the Science Atrium in the Wilfrid Laurier 
Science Building. Increasing the difference between two similar rooms to one room and a large, 
open space was done to maximize the dissimilarity between encoding and recall contexts, and 
to find an effect of context. 
Method 
Participants: An additional 16 participants drawn from the PREP pool were recruited and 
given course credit for their participation. All participants were assigned to the different context 
group DPC3b. Ages ranged from 17 to 22 (M = 19, SD = 1.46) with 10 females and 6 males. 
Apparatus and Materials: Materials used for the encoding process were the same as in 
Experiment 3, with the only change being the room used for the different context condition. 
Previously the Office was used as the different context where groups SIC3 and DPC3 performed 
the recall test. This context was changed to the Science Atrium (context C) in the Wilfrid Laurier 
Science Building (Figure 5). The Atrium is a large open space containing a central area filled with 
desks for student study, a Tim Hortons coffee shop at the west end, and a large staircase and 
elevator leading to the upper areas of the building at the east end. The tall ceiling of the Atrium 
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is lined with sky lights and among the desks are living trees which provide a natural and 
pleasant feel for students in the seating area. Often there are events from different student 
clubs happening at some desks as well as frequent student travel through the central area, 
making the Atrium a frequently busy conversational and study area. The desk and two chairs 
used for this experiment were near the centre of the seating area under the shade of a tree. 
The researcher and participant sat across from one another. 
Procedure: The encoding process proceeded the same way as for group DPC3 from 
Experiment 3, with DPC3b participants being brought to the Lab and listening to L3 from the 
computer. After this, participants were brought downstairs to the Atrium and to the desk used 
for the recall test. They were given 2 minutes to complete as many math questions as they 
could on a piece of paper and then were given 3 minutes to write down any words they could 
remember from the study list. 
Design: A between-groups analysis was used to evaluate an effect of context at two 
levels (SPC3 and DPC3b) on the dependent variable recall including strict and lax recall, as well 
as intrusions. 
Results 
Strict recall means were again in the direction that would be expected by a context 
effect with SPC3 recalling more words (M = 8.06, SD = 3.28) than group DPC3b (M = 7.50, SD = 
2.81) as well as with lax criteria (SPC3: M = 8.19, SD = 3.33, and DPC3b: M = 7.56, SD = 2.83). 
Mean number of intrusions for SPC3 (M = 0.63, SD = 0.89) and DPC3b (M = 0.31, SD = 0.60) 
were similar. A one-way ANOVA used to examine the effect of context revealed a non-significant 
effect on strict recall F(1, 30) = 0.27, p = .61, η2 = .009, as well as lax recall F(1, 30) = 0.33, p 
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= .57, η2 = .011. There was also a non-significant effect on intrusions F(1, 30) = 1.36, p = .25, η2 
= .043. 
Discussion 
Changing the physical different context to a seemingly more distinct context in this 
experiment as compared to the Office from Experiment 3, did not make a difference when 
comparing same to different context conditions. We attempted to make the Atrium a similar 
context to the outdoor contexts used by Brinegar et al. (2013) and Masicampo and Sahakyan 
(2014), as the outdoor contexts contrasted well with their indoor contexts. The Atrium is as 
similar as possible, however due to weather restrictions that would not be comfortable for 
participants, they could not actually be outside. From this change in different contexts, group 
DPC3b recalled only an average of 0.37 more words than group DPC3, making the change from 
Office to Atrium negligible.  
Therefore, the different physical contexts used in the previous three experiments must 
be comparable in terms of distinctness and need not be considered further. Looking back to 
what makes contextual information necessary, the environment or context where item 
encoding takes place has to be emphasized in order to reduce de-contextualization. The 
environment is considered an effective cue when other or better retrieval cues are not 
available, thus requiring it to be included in the memory trace (Smith & Vela, 2001).  
In terms of reducing decontextualization, one factor which is difficult to change and to 
predict is the extent to which participants use their own self-generated mnemonic techniques. 
In fact, some participants were observed or mentioned using such techniques as saying and 
repeating words out loud, reinstating the body posture used during learning, and making visual 
UNRELIABILITY OF IMAGINED CONTEXT EFFECTS IN RECALL                  66 
 
stories out of the words. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants commonly mentioned associating 
the words with aspects of the picture of the mountain scene or the beach. Also, since closing 
the eyes during encoding have been shown to improve memory (Glenberg et al., 1998), 
although instructions were explicitly given to imagination group participants to do so, same and 
different physical context groups may have done this as well. Closing the eyes during encoding 
may have allowed participants to decontextualize their environments because they would not 
be attending to visual details of the physical context. These self-generated techniques are 
difficult to control for as participants engage in them spontaneously and without the knowledge 
of the researcher. Therefore, in the following experiment we attempted to make it necessary for 
participants to rely on context cues, not by controlling for self-generated techniques but by 
explicitly telling participants to use context cues. In this way, by having them focus on the 
context during encoding and at test, they may find these cues the most helpful for recall.  
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Chapter 5: Experiment 4 
Introduction 
To maximize the chance that the environment or physical context where encoding takes 
place was incorporated into a memory trace, all participants were directed to focus on the 
environment both during study and test. Since many other factors may contribute to 
decontextualization, utilization of the encoding context as a memory aid was explicitly 
mentioned to all participants. Furthermore, two word lists were used (with participants being 
asked to recall the first one) to reinforce the likelihood that participants needed to rely on their 
memory for the source of the first list. In order to do this successfully, they needed to use 
physical context cues from the original encoding environment to remember the words. 
Experiment 4 aimed to find a basic physical context effect on recall as well as look at the effect 
of interference when there are multiple sources of information (word lists).  
An interference paradigm was used to carry out these manipulations. Participants 
learned the first word list in the Office (context B) and the second list in the Lab (context A) or 
again in the Office. They then returned to the Office (same context condition) or remained in 
the Lab (different context condition) to recall the first list.  
The introduction of the interference paradigm attempted to highlight the reliance on 
environmental cues. Participants may have thought they needed to be able to recall both lists, 
and would more likely distinguish lists based on environmental contexts seeing as there were no 
other relevant cues available. However, those participants that learned the second, interfering 
list in the same context as the first list would find environmental cues less useful as compared to 
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those who learned the second list in another context. Context B would become associated with 
two lists, therefore contributing to cue overload.  
Four context conditions were created, with each group being either in the same or 
different context for recall as encoding. The same condition interference (SCI) group studied L3 
and L4 in context B and completed recall in B as well. The different condition interference (DCI) 
group studied L3 and L4 in B and completed recall in context A. The different context (DC) group 
studied L3 in B, L4 in A and completed recall in A. Finally, the same context (SC) group studied L3 
in B, L4 in A, and completed recall in B. Essentially, all groups studied L3 in context B, either 
studied L4 in the same (interference) or different context, and then completed recall in the 
same or different context as L3. The experimental design is presented in Table 7.  
It was predicted that groups SCI and DCI who learned the second, interfering list along 
with the first list in context B would recall the least amount of words, with group SCI performing 
worse than group DCI due to being in the same context for both list learning and recall. Context 
effects were expected in groups DC and SC. Context effects would manifest as better recall in 
group SC due to being reinstated in the same context as L3 learning, and worse recall in group 
DC who would not benefit from reinstatement. Although both of these groups are expected to 
perform better than groups SCI and DCI due to being better able to distinguish the two lists, if 
context is important for recall, then group SC should recall more words than group DC. Overall 
performance from worse to best is predicted as group SCI followed by DCI, DC, and finally SC.   
Methods 
Participants: Sixty-five participants were recruited from PREP and given course credit for 
this experiment, with 16 randomly assigned to each of the four context groups (SCI, DCI, DC, 
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and SC) and tested individually. One participant was not included in the analysis as the 
experiment was interrupted before recall data could be collected, and was dropped to ensure 
an equal number of participants per group. Ages of participants ranged from 18 to 28 (M = 19, 
SD = 1.92) with 55 females, 7 males, and 2 non-identified or other gender individuals. This study 
was approved by the Wilfrid Laurier University Research Ethics Board and participants signed a 
consent form (Appendix A) before beginning the experiment. 
Apparatus and Materials: Two word lists were used, each consisting of 25 words. L3 
from Experiment 3 and 3b was used as the first word list and list 4 (L4, Appendix B) was created 
by drawing 25 new words from the Auditory Toronto Noun Pool. The two rooms used for the 
different contexts were again the Lab (A) and the Office (B). Distraction tasks were a sheet of 80 
simple math questions and a moderately-difficult connect-the-dots picture. 
Procedure: Participants began in the Office instead of the Lab this time, where they 
were given instructions about the experiment. These instructions can be viewed in Appendix A. 
They were told that the researchers were interested in looking at not only memory for words 
but memory for where the words were learned as well. They were given an example to help 
them understand this concept. It was made clear that they should try to associate the words 
that they were about to hear with the Office. Participants were also told that they would 
receive two word lists but to keep the words lists separate from each other. All groups received 
the same instructions except for group SCI who was not given information about having to 
associate the words with the Office as they would be in the same environment for both learning 
and test. 
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The first word list (L3) was then presented to all participants, with words being played in 
a random order through the headphones by the computer. Groups DC and SC then proceeded 
to walk to the Lab while engaging in conversation with the researcher. Meanwhile, groups SCI 
and DCI completed the simple math questions in the Office. All groups then heard the second 
list (L4) in which words were also presented in a random order. Before this list was presented, 
groups DCI, DC, and SC were reminded to not only remember the words but to keep the place 
where they learned these words in mind as well.  
Groups then moved or stayed in their room for the recall task. Group DCI moved to Lab 
while group SC moved to the Office and the other two groups SCI and DC stayed where they 
were (Office and Lab, respectively). During the 2 minutes that groups DCI and SC were moving 
to the other rooms, groups SCI and DC performed a connect-the-dots exercise. Further 
instructions to remember the context where L3 was heard during recall was given to groups DCI, 
DC, and SC before the recall task began. All groups were then given 3 minutes to write down any 
words they could remember from the first list (L3) onto a piece of paper.  
Design: A between-subjects design was used to look at the difference in the dependent 
variable (number of words recalled, strict and lax scoring criterion) as well as number of 
intrusions between the four context groups (SCI, DCI, DC, and SC).  
Results 
Mean number of words recalled and number of intrusions are presented in Table 8. 
Mean number of words recalled for all groups was fairly similar, with the average strict recall for 
all groups being 4.48 words (SD = 2.73) and lax recall being 4.64 words (SD = 2.82). A one-way 
ANOVA examining context on strict recall revealed no effect F(3, 60) = 0.16, p = .92, η2 = .008. 
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There was also a non-significant effect of context on lax recall F(3, 60) = 0.31, p = .82, η2 = .015 
as well as a marginal effect on intrusions F(3, 60) = 2.27, p =.09, η2 = .10. Groups DC and SC 
experienced slightly more intrusions of non-list words than groups SCI and DCI.   
Discussion 
Context effects in this experiment seem to be almost eliminated, seeing as all groups 
performed equally as well on the recall test. Although there was a slight trend for same context 
groups SC and SCI to perform better than different context groups DC and DCI, this difference 
was non-significant, demonstrating no effect of context on recall.  
The effect of context on intrusions was marginally significant with the trend in the 
means being opposite than predicted. We predicted that due to the second list being presented 
to groups SCI and DCI in the same context that they would suffer more from cue overload and 
thus experience more intrusions. However, the opposite was found, where groups SC and DC 
experienced more intrusions. Most intrusions that were made among groups did belong to the 
second list, indicating that the list did in fact interfere with their recall of the first list. 
Groups DC and SC may have suffered from physical disruption which caused them to 
confuse the initial source of each word list. Physical disruption may have resulted from the fact 
that groups DC and SC changed back and forth between rooms during list learning, whereas 
groups SCI and DCI remained in the same environment. Thus, source misattribution and 
unfamiliarity of the learning rooms may have contributed to the higher number of intrusions in 
the former groups, leading not only to lowered overall recall, but difficulty distinguishing word 
lists. Previous studies have employed methods to make disruption equal among all study 
groups, such as having participants draw a picture of the other visited context to familiarize 
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themselves with the room whether or not they were to return there for the recall test (Smith et 
al., 1978; Smith, 1979; Wilhite, 1991). Although distraction tasks were given to other groups 
(i.e., math questions, connect-the-dots), these results may indicate that they were not sufficient 
in disrupting participants to the same degree.  
The interference paradigm used in this experiment seems less able to predict context 
effects than the traditional reinstatement paradigm used in the first three experiments. Perhaps 
this is why the reinstatement paradigm has been used more commonly in current research 
instead (Hockley & Bancroft, 2015). Participants may automatically distinguish the lists based on 
other criteria than the environment, thus making a change in contexts for list learning (which 
would usually lead to worse memory) unimportant.  
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Chapter 6: Cumulative Analysis of All Experiments 
 With the overwhelmingly non-significant results in the four experiments carried out in 
this study, we turned to an examination of power of the previous experiments to detect context 
effects. Trends in the means of recall in Experiments 2 and 3 pointed in the direction of context 
effects, with same context groups recalling slightly more words than different context groups. 
However, factors such as the small sample size of each group and variance (i.e., range of words 
recalled, large standard deviations) could have contributed to reduced power in detecting an 
effect of context. Sample sizes in the four experiments conducted here were relatively small, 
with 16 participants per context condition group for a total of 224 participants. These sizes are 
similar to previous studies demonstrating context reinstatement using imagined contexts by 
Smith et al. (1978), Smith (1979), and Masicampo and Sahakyan (2014), but differ from the 
large group sizes used by Brinegar et al. (2013). Efforts were also made to make the four 
experiments of the current study similar to the methodology in previous studies where context 
effects were found. Lastly, context effects may be associated with small effect sizes, making 
them difficult to detect. Smith and Vela (2001), in their meta-analysis of environmental context 
effects, discovered that context-dependent memory experiments typically have a small Cohen’s 
(1988) effect size of d = .28. Cohen (1988) suggested that effect sizes of around d = .20 are 
considered small with d = .50 being medium and d = .80 being large.  
  To address the questions of power and effect size, we compared the same and different 
physical context groups across all four experiments in one analysis. A 2 (same vs. different) × 4 
(Experiment 1, 2, 3, and 4) ANOVA was conducted on both strict and lax recall scoring criterion. 
By combining smaller groups into two context condition groups, we expected to increase the 
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power of detecting context effects that would match the observed trends in Experiments 2 and 
3.  
 The number of strict words recalled in each context condition by experiment number are 
presented in Figure 6. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of experiment number F(3, 216) = 
13.2, p < .001, ηp
2  = .16 but no main effect of context F(1, 216) = 1.84, p = .17, ηp
2  = .008. Post-
hoc analyses using the Bonferroni Correction indicated that the only significant difference was 
between Experiment 4 (M = 4.48, SEM = 0.40) and the other three experiments, Experiment 1 
(M = 7.00, SEM = 0.49), Experiment 2 (M = 6.75, SEM = 0.47), and Experiment 3 (M = 7.91, SEM 
= 0.40). No interaction of context × experiment was revealed F(3, 216) = 0.27, p = .85, ηp
2  = .004. 
 Mean number of words recalled under the lax scoring criterion in each experiment 
according to the context condition are shown in Figure 7. The same 2 (context condition) × 3 
(experiment number) ANOVA was conducted on the number of lax words recalled. A significant 
main effect of experiment number was found F(3, 216) = 15.2, p < .001, ηp
2  = .17. There was also 
no main effect of context F(1, 216) = 2.28, p = .13, ηp
2  = .010. Post hoc analyses using the 
Bonferroni Correction revealed significant differences between Experiment 4 (M = 4.64, SEM = 
0.40) and Experiment 1 (M = 7.89, SEM = 0.49), Experiment 2 (M = 7.48, SEM = 0.49), as well as 
Experiment 3 (M = 8.02 SEM = 0.40). The ANOVA revealed no interaction of context condition × 
experiment number F(3, 216) = 0.28, p = .84, ηp
2  = .004. 
 These results suggest that the failure to find an effect of physical context change in the 
individual experiments presented in this study were not due to a small sample size in each 
experiment. Also, the significant difference in recall between the experiments suggests that the 
failure to find a context effect was not due to level of recall in each experiment. This may 
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instead reflect a difference in type of experimental paradigm used. The mean level of recall in 
Experiments 1 to 3 which used the reinstatement paradigm were closest to each other, and 
were higher than those found in Experiment 4 which used an interference paradigm. 
Furthermore, the non-significant trends in means being more similar to those expected from 
context effects were most notable in the first three experiments than the fourth one, indicating 
that the reinstatement paradigm may be a better way to test for context effects than the 
interference paradigm.  
 Although results suggest that the sample sizes used here were relatively adequate, a 
post-hoc analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) was performed to 
identify the actual number of needed participants in order to find an appropriate level of power. 
Using the average effect size of d = .28 or f = .14 (Cohen, 1988) as calculated by Smith and Vela 
(2001) in their meta-analysis for context effects, along with an 𝛼 = .05, N = 495 participants 
would be required for the study to reach a power of .80. This number is quite large, but is likely 
due to the small effect size found across context studies. Were the effect size instead a medium 
size of d = .50, the same power analysis indicates only 159 participants would be needed to 
attain a power of .80. Therefore, although the number of participants in this study was deemed 
reasonable for the researcher to conduct in the given time, and the cumulative analysis 
indicates that something other than small sample size may be contributing to the absence of 
context effects, we cannot deny that the study would benefit from a larger sample population. 
Overall, it may be the case that small effect sizes, which are expected, made context effects 
difficult to detect. Also, some factors may have interacted in ways that do not promote context 
effects and thus warrant a deeper investigation.  
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Chapter 7: General Discussion 
 It is puzzling as to why the seemingly robust phenomenon of context-dependent 
memory was not demonstrated in any of the four experiments carried out in this study. It was 
initially assumed that an effect of physical context would be found in the first experiment and so 
the second was designed to look at an interesting aspect of imagined contexts, self-relevant 
imagined contexts. We were hoping to be able to add to literature regarding the usefulness of 
imagined reinstatement as a way to aid memory, as mental reinstatement has shown to be 
beneficial in areas such as eyewitness memory and could also help with aging, education and 
clinical applications. Examining self-relevant imagined contexts had to be suspended however, 
as basic context effects, not just those of mental reinstatement, but of physical reinstatement, 
were not revealed. 
 Experiments 2 and 3 were encouraging because although non-significant, mean number 
of words recalled in same context groups tended to be higher than different context groups. 
Experiment 3, where extra efforts were put forth to make the same and different contexts very 
distinct and the imagined context quite salient, had the highest overall level of recall among the 
other experiments. This suggests that some participants may have been benefiting from 
environmental context cues, but not enough that there was a significant effect of context. 
Experiment 4 had the most consistent level of recall among all groups, demonstrating that 
contextual cues were the least important to the same and different context groups.  
Experiment 4 also demonstrated that even when there is interfering information, 
participants are still able to identify individual words and parcel lists apart when there is a 
change in context. The utilization of the interference paradigm in this fourth experiment also 
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seemed to highlight the non-significance of physical environmental reinstatement as compared 
to mental reinstatement. As in Smith’s 1979 study where he instructed different context 
participants to mentally reinstate their previous learning environment, we asked different 
context group participants to do the same in the DC condition. We further predicted that the SC 
group would have done even better due to receiving the same mental reinstatement 
instructions while also being in the same physical environment instead of a different context. DC 
group participants may have found it more challenging to mentally reinstate the context when 
physical cues were not apparent. However, seeing that both groups performed equally as well, 
this could mean that mental reinstatement is still an effective method to enhance recall but that 
physical reinstatement is not necessary to facilitate memory.  
An interesting consideration is one in which we compare the current study to those of 
classroom studies that found no effect of context on recall. In these studies, students who were 
tested in a classroom or training environment different from that at study found that context 
did not have an effect on their ability to remember information. This was the case whether it 
was related or unrelated to their school studies (Saufley et al., 1985; Koens et al., 2003; 
Conveney et al., 2013). Several reasons were advanced on why this may be the case, and why 
students did not seem to processes or utilize environmental information during encoding and 
test. 
Most notably, decontextualization in these classroom studies may have occurred due to 
students using their own self-generated memorization techniques. Students, the participants in 
this study, are very adept at learning and test taking in school environments. Rote memorization 
of material is a particularly simple task that students have likely developed quick mnemonics for 
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and use frequently while learning. They may even have viewed this experiment as just another 
school test, and behaved much the same as they would in that type of situation. The reliance on 
their own techniques would detract from using the environment as an effective cue, and thus 
context effects would be absent. Participants in this study did mention using their own methods 
to learn the study words, often expressing that they were unaware of the global environment 
and did not make conscious associations between the words and the physical environment.  
Although it was intended that context be global in nature, in the fourth experiment we 
moved to a more local manipulation of context, where we asked participants to directly include 
the environment in their study of the words. Participants may still have ignored the local 
context or found it difficult to both memorize words while ‘using the context to help their 
memory’. They may also have not understood what this instruction meant. In Eich’s (1985) 
study of context, he asked participants to directly associate words with specific objects in the 
room in a manipulation of local context. This was intended to make recall reliant upon the 
objects as environmental cues, however, context effects were also absent. Therefore, although 
local manipulations of context may seem more likely to show context effects, such as in studies 
of recognition (Hockley & Bancroft, 2015), it is unsure how the same applies to recall.  
Future examinations may include the type of procedures and contexts that best elicit 
context effects. Type of context or encoding instruction may make up part of the reason why 
context effects are found in some studies but not in others. For example, in Experiment 2, we 
predicted that self-relevant imagined contexts may enhance the benefits of common imagined 
contexts. While self-relevant information is generally remembered better than other types of 
information (Symons & Johnson, 1997), they do not always lead to context effects. McDaniel et 
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al. (1989) demonstrated that when participants were asked to encode sentences in a self-
referential manner, context effects were absent. Participants learned nouns embedded in 
common or bizarre sentences (e.g. “The DOG rode the BICYCLE down the STREET”) and either 
related the information to some event or object in their lives (self-referential) or simply rated 
the information on it’s level of normalcy while in one physical context. Upon switching contexts, 
only participants who did not use the self-referential encoding method showed context effects. 
The authors attribute this to the fact that self-referential encoding may induce the participants 
to use internal organizational processing instead of contextual information, thus negating the 
context effects. Although this may account for the reason why context effects were not seen in 
the SRIC group of Experiment 2 in this study, they do not seem to make sense of the fact that 
there was no basic context effect seen with the different physical context group.   
The absence of context effects was also found when participants were asked to encode 
sentences using visualization of the nouns by imagination and when asked to organize 
sentences by their relation to one another (McDaniel et al., 1989). Type of processing used 
when encoding also seems to extend to shallow or deep processing, where shallow encoding 
encourages context effects more than deep encoding (Smith, 1986). Type of context may also 
affect whether context effects are found. It seems to be that artificial environments, such as 
those created on the computer using pictures or photos and even virtual reality, show robust 
context effects. In fact, Smith and Manzano (2010) found particularly strong context effects 
when using video clips as environmental contexts. Participants learned words superimposed on 
5-second videos depicting natural scenes. Those who experienced reinstated environments at 
test remembered many more words than those in the different context condition. Clearly, type 
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of context then, whether it be video or photo, seems to impact how individuals remember 
information. Overall, strategies that seem to encourage participants to use internal 
organizations or elaborative encoding decontextualize relevant cues from the environment. 
Type of context also seems to play a role, however, in which ways they influence memory still 
warrants more investigation.   
 Forgetting information after a change in context goes hand in hand with reinstatement. 
We are likely familiar with the occurrence of these phenomena – we stand staring at an open 
fridge forgetting what we wanted, only to have it come to us when we are back in the other 
room. We visit old schools for class reunions and memories from our school years come 
flooding back. Although we are aware that these instances occur, they are not as reliable when 
attempting to elicit them in the laboratory. Recall seems to be improved by a variety of factors, 
such as imagery, self-referential encoding methods, and repetition of material for example, but 
how context influences these factors is less reliable. Also, type of context, whether imagined or 
physically present, pose challenges for understanding both encoding and retrieval of desired 
information. If we can ultimately find a way to maximize beneficial properties of encoding and 
retrieval environments, then surely memory will improve upon context reinstatement.   
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Tables 
Table 1 
 
Experimental design for Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 3b with imagined context (yes or no) 
and environmental contexts Lab (A), Office (B), and Atrium (C) for all study groups during 
list learning and recall 
 
  Task 
Experiment 
Number 
Context 
Condition 
Imagination List learning Recall 
1 SPC No A A 
DPC No A B 
SIC Yes A B 
    
2 DPC2 No A B 
SIC2 Yes A B 
SRIC Yes A B 
    
3 SPC3 No A B 
DPC3 No A B 
SIC3 Yes A B 
    
3b DPC3b No A C 
 
Note. See individual experiments for names of each context condition group. 
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Table 2 
 
Mean number of words recalled (strict and lax criteria) and number of intrusions in 
Experiment 1, for context conditions same physical context (SPC), different physical 
context (DPC) and same imagined context (SIC) 
 
 Context Condition 
Criterion SPC DPC SIC 
Strict Recall 6.69 (4.45) 6.94 (2.98) 7.44 (3.01) 
Lax Recall 7.75 (4.28) 7.81 (2.93) 8.19 (2.90) 
Intrusions 0.69 (1.25) 1.31 (1.35) 1.00 (0.90) 
 
Note. Standard deviations presented in parentheses. 
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Table 3 
 
Mean number of words recalled (strict and lax criteria) and number of intrusions in 
Experiment 2, for different physical context 2 (DPC2), same imagined context 2 (SIC2) and 
self-relevant imagined context (SRIC) context conditions 
 
 Context Condition 
Criterion DPC2 SIC2 SRIC 
Strict Recall 6.44 (2.58) 7.38 (3.18) 6.85 (3.11) 
Lax Recall 7.19 (2.88) 8.25 (3.28) 7.31 (3.46) 
Intrusions 0.69 (1.01) 0.50 (1.03) 0.56 (0.81) 
  
Note. Standard deviations presented in parentheses. 
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Table 4 
 
Mean vividness ratings on a scale from 1 (unclear) to 5 (clear) at three times (beginning, 
middle, and end) of word list presentation for imagination groups SIC2 and SRIC in 
Experiment 2 
 
 Scale Presentation Time  
Context Condition Beginning Middle End Average 
SIC2 3.81 (0.66) 2.88 (1.03) 2.94 (1.00) 3.21 (0.52) 
SRIC 4.13 (0.72) 3.31 (0.95) 3.00 (0.97) 3.48 (0.58) 
 
Note. SIC2 = same imagined context 2 and SRIC = self-relevant imagined context. 
Standard deviations presented in parentheses. 
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Table 5 
 
Mean number of words recalled (strict and lax criteria) and number of intrusions in 
Experiment 3, for context conditions same physical context 3 (SPC3), different physical 
context 3 (DPC3), and same imagined context 3 (SIC3) 
 
 Context Condition 
Criterion SPC3 DPC3 SIC3 
Strict Recall 8.06 (3.28) 7.13 (2.92) 8.94 (4.30) 
Lax Recall 8.19 (3.33) 7.19 (2.86) 9.13 (4.32) 
Intrusions 0.63 (0.89) 0.69 (0.87) 1.19 (1.17) 
 
Note. Standard deviations presented in parentheses. 
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Table 6 
 
Mean number of words recalled (strict criterion) per level of recall (high – above the 
median, and low – below the median) for each context condition (SPC3, DPC3, and SIC3) 
in Experiment 3 
 
 Level of Recall 
Context Condition High Low 
SPC3 10.7 (2.32) 5.38 (1.06) 
DPC3 9.50 (0.93) 4.75 (2.12) 
SIC3 12 (3.46) 5.89 (2.48) 
 
Note. Standard deviations presented in parentheses.  
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Table 7 
 
Environmental contexts Office (B) or Lab (A) for list learning and recall tasks for context 
conditions same context interference (SCI), different context interference (DCI), different 
context (DC), and same context (SC) in Experiment 4 
 
 Task 
Context Condition L3 L4 Recall 
SCI B B B 
DCI B B A 
DC B A A 
SC B A B 
  
Note. L3 = word list 3 and L4 = word list 4. 
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Table 8 
 
Mean number of words recalled (strict and lax criteria) and number of intrusions for 
context groups same context interference (SCI), different context interference (DCI), 
different context (DC), and same context (SC) in Experiment 4 
 
 Context Condition 
Criterion SCI DCI DC SC 
Strict Recall 4.63 (3.95) 4.25 (2.11) 4.25 (2.21) 4.81 (2.48) 
Lax Recall 4.81 (4.15) 4.31 (2.06) 4.31 (2.39) 5.13 (2.39) 
Intrusions 1.13 (1.31) 1.00 (0.82) 2.13 (1.93) 1.81 (1.47) 
  
Note. Standard deviations presented in parentheses.  
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Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Memory Laboratory cubicle used as one physical context  
environment. 
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Figure 2. Office, used as one physical context environment. 
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Figure 3. Mountain and pathway scene drawn from Hancock et al. (1992) used as the 
imagined context for group SIC in Experiment 1 and group SIC2 in Experiment 2. 
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Figure 4. Beach scene used as the imagined context for group SIC3 in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 5. Science Atrium used as the different physical context in  
Experiment 3b for group DPC3b.  
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Figure 6. Average number of strict criterion words recalled in each context condition 
 as a function of experiment number.  
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Figure 7. Average number of lax criterion words recalled in each context condition  
as a function of experiment number.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
9
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 and 3b Experiment 4
M
ea
n
 N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
W
o
rd
s 
R
ec
al
le
d
 
Experiment Number
Same
Different
Context 
Condition
UNRELIABILITY OF IMAGINED CONTEXT EFFECTS IN RECALL                  106 
 
Appendix A 
 
Informed Consent Statement 
 
Wilfrid Laurier University 
Informed Consent Statement 
Free Recall and Scene Imagination during an Auditory Presentation of Words 
Caitlin Tozios & William Hockley, Department of Psychology 
Wilfrid Laurier University (REB # 4905) 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study being conducted by Caitlin Tozios under the 
supervision of William Hockley of the Department of Psychology from Wilfrid Laurier University. The 
purpose of this study is to further research in memory and cognition by looking at scene imagination 
and recall for studied words. 
 
INFORMATION 
You will begin the experiment in the Memory Lab (SR212) where you will listen to a list of study words 
presented through headphones attached to a computer. You will also be asked to remember the 
presented words and also to follow some additional instructions presented on the computer screen. 
Some participants may be asked to imagine a scene or write down some information during the 
experiment. You may then be asked to move to an office (N2032) in order to complete a free recall task. 
The full purpose of this study cannot be disclosed at this time, but you will receive a full explanation at 
the completion of the study. The experiment will take approximately 20-30 minutes to complete and a 
total of 96 participants will be recruited through PREP to participate in this study. Each participant will 
be tested individually, one at a time.  
 
RISKS 
There are no immediate risks to be concerned about in this study, however you may find the recall task 
to be difficult. The task is designed to be difficult which is common in these types of memory studies, so 
please do not feel distress regarding your performance in this study. Any feelings of distress concerning 
performance are normal and should be temporary. If you experience any negative effects as a result of 
participating in this study, please contact the researchers.  
 
BENEFITS 
Results from this study will contribute to the scientific literature on imagination and free recall in 
memory and cognition. You will be able to gain practical experience by participating in an experimental 
paradigm that you may have come across in Introductory Psychology courses or Memory and Cognition 
courses on human memory.  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All data gathered from this study will be stored electronically without any identifying information. 
Individual results will not be reported. Participants will be asked to provide their name and Laurier email 
address for the purpose of assigning PREP credit. This information will be collected and stored separate 
from the data and will be destroyed by the researchers after the PREP credit has been assigned (no later 
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than March 31, 2017). At all times, only the researchers (Caitlin Tozios and William Hockley) will have 
access to the data. The anonymous electronic data will be stored indefinitely and securely in the 
researcher’s locked lab and office. The data may be reanalyzed as part of a separate project (i.e., 
secondary data analysis). Consent forms will also be stored securely in the locked office and will be 
destroyed (shredded) by the researchers no later than March 31st, 2017.       
  
 
Participant’s Initials   
COMPENSATION 
By participating in this study you will earn 0.5 participation credit towards a component in your course 
grade. Alternatively, you may write a critical review of a journal for participation credit. Information 
about writing the review can be found on the WLU psychology department website under ‘documents’ 
or you may contact the Psychology Office for more details. If you decide to withdraw from this study 
prior to its completion you will still receive the participation credit and any information you supplied will 
be electronically deleted. 
  
CONTACT 
If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures (or if you experience adverse 
effects as a result of participating in this study), you may contact the researcher, Caitlin Tozios, 
Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University, tozi4380@mylaurier.ca. You may also contact the 
researcher William Hockley, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University, 519.884.0710, 
extension 3737, or whockley@wlu.ca. This project has been reviewed and approved by the Research 
Ethics Board at Wilfrid Laurier University (REB #4905), which is supported by the Research Support Fund. 
If you feel you have not been treated according to the descriptions within this statement, or your rights 
as a participant in research have been violated during the course of this study, you may contact Dr. 
Robert Basso, Chair of the Research Ethics Board, Wilfrid Laurier University, 519.884.0710, extension 
4994, or rbasso@wlu.ca.  
  
PARTICIPATION 
Your participation in this study is voluntary and you may decline to participate without penalty. If you 
decide to participate, you may withdraw at any time without penalty and without loss of benefits to 
which you are otherwise entitled. If you withdraw from this study before its completion, any data 
collected will be electronically deleted. After completion of the study however, your data cannot be 
deleted because the data will be stored without any identifying information.  
 
FEEDBACK AND PUBLICATION 
You will be given information describing the purpose of this study and any further information at the 
end of this session. A summary of the findings of this study will be posted on the Psychology Research 
Bulletin Board and emailed to you via the PREP system by March 31st 2017. Results of this study could be 
submitted for publication to a cognitive psychology journal such as the Canadian Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, or Memory & Cognition, and may be made available through Open Access resources. The 
findings will be included in the researcher’s Master’s thesis.  
 
CONSENT 
I have read and understand the above information. I have received a copy of this form. I agree to 
participate in this study. 
UNRELIABILITY OF IMAGINED CONTEXT EFFECTS IN RECALL                  108 
 
 
 
Participant’s signature                        Date      
 
 
 
Investigator’s signature                        Date      
 
 
Study Instructions for Experiment 1 
 
The following are the study instructions which participants read on the computer or were orally 
instructed (italic text) by the researcher. Any information appearing in square brackets were events that 
occurred or actions completed by participants. All instructions were displayed after participants filled 
out some basic demographic information and signed the consent form. 
 
Groups SPC, DPC and SIC (bolded): 
 
Please put on your headphones. Press the spacebar when you are ready to proceed. 
 
The following is a tone that you will hear throughout the experiment. [Tone played]. This tone signals 
the end of a task. [Tone played]. If you need to stop the experiment you may do so after the tone. 
Please press the spacebar to proceed to the experiment.  
 
You will see some simple math questions appear on the screen. Please type the correct answer into the 
box that appears followed by the ‘enter key’ in order to go to the next question. Press the spacebar to 
continue. Please view the following image. It will remain on the screen for 2 minutes. When you see 
the image, take a moment to observe the scene before you close your eyes. With your eyes closed, 
imagine as though you are within the scene. When the task ends after 2 minutes you will hear a tone 
and you may open your eyes. Press the spacebar when you are ready. 
[~40 (2 mins) math questions appear, image of mountain scene shown on computer] 
[Tone played] 
 
A list of words will now be presented through the headphones. Please listen and remember these 
words. While listening, imagine as though you are within the scene you just saw.  It is important that 
you try your best to imagine a clear image while the words are being played. You may close your eyes, 
a tone will signal the end of this task. When the task is finished, please exit the cubicle and speak to the 
researcher. Press the spacebar to proceed. 
[List of words played] 
[Tone played] 
Please exit the cubicle and call the researcher to begin the next phase of the experiment. 
 
[Participants move to the office (DPC and SIC) or stay in the Lab (SPC) while engaging in casual 
conversation with the researcher] 
 
You will now be given 3 minutes to write down any words you can remember from before on the paper 
in front of you. Before you complete this task, please re-imagine the scene from before that you were 
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thinking of when you listened to the words. While writing any words you can remember, re-imagine 
that you are in the previous scene. Press the spacebar when you are ready to begin. 
[Free recall task] 
[Tone played] 
 
[Experiment over] 
Thank you, the experiment is now complete. Please speak with the researcher to collect the study 
information sheet and ask any questions you may have. 
 
 
Study Instructions for Experiment 2 
 
Group DPC2: 
 
Please put on your headphones. Press the space bar when you are ready to proceed. 
 
The following is a tone that you will hear throughout the experiment. [Tone played]. This tone signals 
the end of a task. [Tone played]. If you need to stop the experiment you may do so after the tone. 
Please press the spacebar to proceed to the experiment.  
 
You will see some simple math questions appear on the screen. Please type the correct answer into the 
box that appears followed by the ‘enter key’ in order to go to the next question. Press the spacebar to 
continue. 
[~100 (5 mins) math questions appear] 
[Tone played] 
 
A list of words will now be presented through the headphones. Please listen and remember these 
words. When the task is finished please exit the cubicle and speak to the researcher. Press the spacebar 
to continue. 
[Fatigue scale presented at beginning, middle (after 10th word) and end of word list] 
Please complete the following scale by typing the corresponding number.  
How tired do you feel right now? 
1 – exhausted 
2 – tired 
3 – neither tired nor energized (neutral) 
4 – alert 
5 – alert (energized) 
[List of words played] 
[Tone played] 
Please exit the cubicle and speak to the researcher. 
 
[Participants move to office, along the way engage in casual conversation with researcher] 
 
Please put on your headphones. You will now be given 3 minutes to write down any words you can 
remember from before on the piece of paper in front of you. Press the spacebar when you are ready to 
begin. 
[Free recall task] 
[Tone played] 
UNRELIABILITY OF IMAGINED CONTEXT EFFECTS IN RECALL                  110 
 
 
You will again see some simple math questions. Type the correct answer into the box that appears 
followed by the ‘enter’ key in order to go to the next question. Press the spacebar to continue. 
[~60 (3 mins) math questions appear] 
[Tone played] 
 
[Experiment over] 
Thank you, the experiment is now complete. Please speak with the researcher to collect the study 
information sheet and ask any questions you may have. 
 
Groups SIC2 and SRIC (bolded): 
Please put on your headphones. Press the spacebar when you are ready to proceed. 
 
The following is a tone that you will hear throughout the experiment. [Tone played]. This tone signals 
the end of a task. [Tone played]. If you need to stop the experiment you may do so after the tone. 
Please press the spacebar to proceed to the experiment.  
 
Please view the following image. It will remain on the screen for 1 minute. When you see the image, 
take a moment to observe the scene before you close your eyes. With your eyes closed, imagine as 
though you are within the scene. You are asked to construct an imagined location in your mind. Please 
think of a place that is familiar to you, somewhere you visit often, or a personally meaningful area. 
For example, you may imagine a room in your house (bedroom, kitchen), a room you go to at school 
(library, gym), somewhere you visit outdoors (park, garden), or a place you have been for vacation 
(beach, cottage, city street). Press the spacebar if you understand. 
When you have thought of a location that is important or familiar to you, please vividly imagine 
yourself in this place. Take note of things and objects you can see in this place and any sounds or 
smells that may be present. You will be given some time to close your eyes and imagine your place 
fully and clearly after these instructions. When this task ends, you will hear a tone and you may open 
your eyes. Press the spacebar when you are ready to begin the imagination task. 
[Mountain scene displayed for 1 minute, imagine scene] 
[Tone played] 
 
Now you will be given 3 minutes to write a descriptive paragraph about the scene you just imagined. 
Please write down any details about the scene on the piece of paper in front of you. You do not have to 
worry about paragraph structure, spelling or completeness. For example you may write: ‘The scene I 
imagined was my bedroom. In my room there is a bed on the far left wall and a desk adjacent to it. 
My bedspread has a print of multiple small pink flowers on a white background. Often it smells of 
vanilla when I light a candle in the room…’ Press the spacebar when you are ready to continue. 
[Write paragraph] 
[Tone played] 
 
Take this opportunity to again imagine the same scene as you have just described. Close your eyes as 
you imagine the scene, a tone will signal when you may open your eyes. Press the spacebar to begin. 
[Imagine scene for 1 minute] 
[Tone played] 
 
A list of words will now be presented through the headphones. Please listen and remember these 
words. While listening, imagine as though you are within the personal scene that you just imagined as 
UNRELIABILITY OF IMAGINED CONTEXT EFFECTS IN RECALL                  111 
 
you remember the words. It is important to try your best to imagine a clear image while the words are 
being played. When the task is finished please exit the cubicle and speak to the researcher. Press the 
spacebar to proceed. 
[Vividness scale presented at beginning, middle (after 10th word) and end of word list]  
Please complete the following scale by pressing the corresponding number on the keyboard.  
How vivid/clear is your imagined environment at this time?  
1 – not vivid at all (unclear) 
2 – vaguely vivid 
3 – neither clear nor unclear 
4 – mostly vivid 
5 – very vivid (clear) 
[List of words played] 
[Tone played] 
Please exit the cubicle and speak to the researcher. 
 
[Participants move to office, along the way engage in casual conversation with researcher] 
 
Please put on your headphones. You will now be given 3 minutes to write down any words you can 
remember from before on the piece of paper in front of you. Before you complete this task, please re-
imagine the scene from before that you were thinking of when you listened to the words. While writing 
any words you can remember, re-imagine that you are in the previous scene. Press the spacebar when 
you are ready to begin. 
[Free recall task] 
[Tone played] 
 
Please write another short paragraph describing your imagined scene as it appears currently in your 
mind. Again, do not worry about paragraph structure, spelling or completeness. Also, you do not need 
to worry about providing new details; it is fine to repeat information as long as what you write 
accurately and fully describes your imagined scene. Please press the spacebar to begin. 
[Type paragraph] 
[Tone played] 
 
[Experiment over] 
Thank you, the experiment is now complete. Please speak with the researcher to collect the study 
information sheet and ask any questions you may have. 
 
 
Study Instructions for Experiment 3 and 3b 
 
Groups SPC3, DPC3, SIC3 (bolded), and DPC3b: 
 
Please put on your headphones. Press the space bar when you are ready to proceed. 
 
The following is a tone that you will hear throughout the experiment. [Tone played]. This tone signals 
the end of a task. [Tone played]. If you need to stop the experiment you may do so after the tone. 
Please press the space bar to proceed to the experiment.  
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You will see some simple math questions appear on the screen. Please type the correct answer into the 
box that appears followed by the ‘enter key’ in order to go to the next question. Please view the 
following image. It will remain on the screen for 2 minutes. When you see the image, take a moment 
to observe the scene before you close your eyes. Notice any details, colours or sights that you would 
experience were you actually in the scene. What do you smell? What can you feel? With your eyes 
closed, imagine clearly as though you are within the scene.  When the task ends after 2 minutes you 
will hear a tone and you may open your eyes. Press the space bar to continue. 
[~40 (2 mins) math questions appear, beach scene displayed] 
[Tone played] 
 
A list of words will now be presented through the headphones. Please listen and remember these 
words. While listening, imagine as though you are within the scene you just saw. It is important that 
you try your best to imagine a clear image while the words are being played. You may close your eyes; 
a tone will signal the end of this task. Press the space bar to proceed. 
[List of words played] 
[Tone played] 
 
Please view this image again and keep it in your mind as you proceed to the next part of the 
experiment. 
[Black screen displayed, beach scene displayed for 5 seconds] 
 
The list of words you heard earlier will be repeated again. Please listen and remember these words 
while imagining yourself in the scene you just saw. Press the space bar to continue. 
[Words played] 
[Tone played] 
 
Please exit the cubicle and call the researcher to begin the next phase of the experiment. 
 
[Participants remain in the Lab (SPC3), move to the office (DPC3, and SIC3) or the Atrium (DPC3b) for the 
recall task, instructions given orally for group DPC3, SIC3, and DPC3b] 
 
Take 2 minutes to again complete some simple math questions. Press the space bar to begin. Take 2 
minutes to write down details about the scene you imagined before on the piece of paper in front of 
you. They can be in point form. I will let you know when time is up. 
[Tone played] 
 
Please type (write down) any words you can remember from before using the keyboard (piece of paper 
in front of you). While writing down the words, use the imagined scene to help you remember any of 
the words. A tone will signal when the experiment is over (I will let you know when time is up). 
[Tone played] 
 
[Experiment over] 
Thank you, the experiment is now complete. Please speak with the researcher to collect the study 
information sheet and ask any questions you may have. 
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Study Instructions for Experiment 4 
 
Group SCI, DCI, DC and SC (bolded): 
 
In this study you will be presented with two lists of words which we ask you to remember, however 
please keep these two lists separate. We are also interested not only in memory for words but memory 
for where or the place where words are learned. For example, you may find it easier to remember 
something your friend told you if you remember the place where they told it to you, such as in a coffee 
shop or at school where you visit frequently together or in a visually distinct place like a museum or 
colourful outdoor venue, than in a place where you two don’t normally go to, or is dull and 
undistinctive. If the place is easy to remember, you would be more likely to remember the information 
as well. When you are listening to the words, keep in mind the visual aspects of this location as well. 
 
Sound test: you will soon hear a tone. Please put on your headphones and press the spacebar to 
proceed. [Tone played]Press the space bar if you heard the tone, if not, please alert the researcher.  
 
You will now be presented a list of words, please listen and remember the words, press the spacebar to 
proceed. 
[L1 played] 
Thank you, please speak to the researcher for the next task. 
 
Please complete this sheet of math questions, do as many as you can in 2 minutes. I will tell you when 
time is up. 
[Math questions presented on paper for groups SCI and DCI] 
 
[Groups DC and SC move to Office] 
 
The second word list will now be presented, before the next list is presented, please remember that 
memory for the place in which these words are important as well, and to keep this place in mind. Press 
the spacebar to proceed 
[L2 played] 
Thank you, please speak to the researcher for the next task 
 
[Group DCI moves to office, group SC returns to the Lab] 
 
Please complete this connect-the-dots exercise and complete as much as you can in 2 minutes. I will tell 
you when time is up. 
[Connect-the-dots exercise presented on paper for group SCI and DC only] 
 
I will now give you 3 minutes to write down any words you can remember from the first list. Try to 
remember where you were when you first studied the words in the first list. Thinking about where you 
were may help you to remember the words. 
[Free Recall of L1] 
 
[Experiment over] 
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Appendix B 
 
Word List 1 (L1) 
Monster 
Thunder 
Cherry 
Sailor 
Summer 
Beggar 
Jewel 
Traitor 
Echo 
Survey 
Estate 
Butcher 
Paper 
Village 
Hotel 
Picture 
Column 
Question 
Model 
Costume 
 
 
Word List 2 (L2) 
Shower 
Feather 
Widow 
Attack 
Notion 
Metal 
Pilot 
Outline 
Agent 
Lady 
Writer 
Chapel 
Poem 
Letter 
Contest 
Series 
Ribbon 
Goddess 
Meaning 
Harness 
 
 
Word List 3 (L3) 
Hotel 
Widow 
Outline 
Paper 
Series 
Jewel 
Summer 
Letter 
Model 
Echo 
Attack 
Sailor 
Goddess 
Question 
Agent 
Monster 
Traitor 
Contest 
Costume 
Butcher 
Chapel 
Pilot 
Notion 
Village 
Lady 
 
 
Word List 4 (L4) 
Climate 
Feeling 
Prayer 
Steamer 
Worship 
Baby 
Event 
Payment 
Soldier 
Wagon 
Basin 
Dinner 
Mistake 
Servant 
Winter 
Bushel 
Island 
Oyster 
Robber 
Chairman 
Leather 
Meeting 
Single 
Bubble 
Pasture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
